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The question of who has the right to govern and control Indian
country has remained unresolved in American jurisprudence for over
two hundred years. Unfortunately, the answers have constantly
fluctuated, leaving uncertainty in the area of tribal jurisdiction. The
crux of the problem is that three distinct governmental entities claim
jurisdiction over Indian lands. The federal government claims jurisdic-
tion over Indian country as the dominant sovereign throughout the
United States.' The states where the land is situated claim jurisdiction
because Indian lands are not extra-territorial and thus states believe
that the land should be regulated by state and other local govern-
ments.2 Indian tribes claim jurisdiction based on their inherent sover-
* Mr. Mack is a partner in the San Diego Office of Latham & Watkins specializ-
ing in environmental law. Mr. Mack extends special appreciation to Taylor Miller and
Steven Chestnut who graciously reviewed and commented on this Article. The opin-
ions expressed in this Article are solely those of Mr. Mack and Ms. Timms and do
not necessarily reflect the opinions of Latham & Watkins or its clients.
** Ms. Timms is an associate in the San Diego Office of Latham & Watldns.
1. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 544 (1823). In Johnson, the Supreme Court
addressed the issue of title to Indian lands. The Court concluded that the right of
alienation of Indian lands was dependent upon the laws of the United States govern-
ment. Id. at 565. As a dominant sovereign, the United States claims power to govern
the Indian tribes through the Indian Commerce Clause, which grants Congress the
power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, and the Treaty Power, which
grants Congress the exclusive power to enter into treaties. Robert Laurence, The
Indian Commerce Clause, 23 AIZ. L REV. 203, 224 (1981).
2. Judith V. Royster & Rory SnowArrow Fausett, Control of the Reservation
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eign powers to regulate Indian persons and lands as native nations.3
Jurisdictional disputes rarely arise between the Indian tribes and the
federal government because it is a well settled principle that the federal
government has the power to govern the Indian tribes." However,
jurisdictional issues often arise between the states and the Indian
tribes.6 The earliest decisions of the Supreme Court suggested that the
Indian reservations were wholly separate from the states and the states'
jurisdiction.' Subsequent decisions by the Court have eroded this
principle, however, and no clear standard has emerged to replace it.7
Several distinct areas of law are impacted by jurisdictional disputes
between states and tribes. Some of the most frequently litigated areas
include environmental matters, gainng regulations, and fish and game
issues.8 Many problems arise in these areas, however, because prece-
Environment: Tribal Primacy, Federal Delegation, and the Limits of State Intrusion,
64 WASH. L. REV. 581, 600 (1989). According to one commentator, "[T]he proposition
that federal law recognizes the sovereignty of Indian governments over Indian lands
and over those who pass over Indian lands was still considered controversial, if not
subversive" in Arizona just fifteen years ago. Eric N. Dahlston, Indian Law, 29 ARM
ATr'y, July 1993, at 13.
3. Royster & Fausett, supra note 2, at 593. In Worcester v. Georgia, Chief Jus-
tice Marshall characterized the native nations as "distinct, independent political com-
munities." 31 U.S. 515, 559-60 (1932). The Court in Worcester, however, found that the
federal government has the right to govern the Native Nations. Id. at 593.
4. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559-62 (finding a Georgia statute inapplicable where a
missionary entered the Cherokee Nation with the permission of the federal and tribal
governments, but in violation of a Georgia statute); see also Jana L Walker & Kevin
Gover, Commercial Solid and Hazardous Waste Disposal Projects on Indian Lands,
NAT. RESOURCES J., 6 Feb. 1992, at 5 (stating that the first step in determining juris-
diction over Indian tribes is to inquire as to whether the federal "statutes apply to
Indians, Indian tribes, and the Indian lands").
5. "The Question of the proper scope of state jurisdiction over Indian affairs has
been a topic of dispute for nearly a century and a half." Patrick E. Hacker et al.,
Comment, State Jurisdiction Over Indian Land Use: An Interpretation of the
'Encumbrance' Savings Clause of Public Law 280, 9 LAND & WATER L REV. 421
(1974); see also Steven M. Christenson, Note, Regulatory Jurisdiction over Non-Indi-
an Hazardous Waste in Indian Country, 72 IowA L REV. 1091 (1987).
6. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 557.
7. "[T]here is no rigid rule by which to resolve the question of whether a particu-
lar state law may be applied to an Indian reservation or to tribal members." White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980). In White Mountain
Apache Tribe, the Supreme Court found that state taxes affecting logging on an
Indian reservation are preempted by federal law. Id. at 138. However, the Court
weighed numerous issues in reaching this decision. Id.
8. See, e.g., California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987)
(state attempted to regulate gaming enterprises on Indian reservation); Washington v.
Environmental Protection Agency, 752 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir. 1985) (state attempted
to impose environmental laws on tribe); Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game,
433 U.S. 165 (1977) (state attempted to apply state fishery conservation measures
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dents regarding tribal/state jurisdiction in one of these areas often have
little or no applicability in another area. Because the law concerning
tribal/state jurisdiction is extremely subject-matter specific, it lends
little guidance to states or tribes in determining who has authority to
regulate Indian lands.
Litigation concerning Indian lands has exploded in the past twenty
years.0 Many of the cases have attempted to decipher jurisdiction
among Native American tribes and the states." The result is a loss to
both parties. The tribes and states have expended precious resources
on continuous litigation. Industries, uncertain of what laws apply to
tribes, have shied away from developing business on reservations. The
relationship between the tribes and states has been strained, causing
both parties to jealously guard jurisdiction over areas that affect the
other. Consequently, it is in the best interests of the tribes and states to
direct time and money toward durable solutions to the underlying
problems." States and tribes should look to a forum other than the
courtroom to address their disagreements and reach solutions that
benefit both parties' objectives.
One possible solution to the problem of uncertainty and litigation is a
against tribe).
* 9. Although courts may rely on dicta of previously decided cases, each case is
generally so fact specific that the courts reach differing, and often contradictory,
results. Compare Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983) (state could require a tribal
member to obtain a state liquor license) with Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480
U.S. at 220 (Court limited Rice to its facts and found that state could not regulate
gaming enterprises on an Indian reservation).
10. Since 1970, the Supreme Court has issued more Indian law decisions than it
has decisions in the fields of consumer law and antitrust law combined. Peter W. Sly,
EPA and Indian Reservations: Justice Stevens' Factual Approach, 20 ENVTL L REP.
10429, 10430 (1990).
11. See, e.g., Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nations,
492 U.S. 408 (1989) (finding that tribe lacked jurisdiction to zone certain Indian
lands); Annis v. Dewey County Bank, 335 F. Supp. 133 (S.D. 1971) (holding that state
lacked jurisdiction to enforce a judgement on an Indian reservation); Agua Caliente
Band of Mission Indians v. City of Palm Springs, 347 F. Supp. 42 (C.D. Cal. 1972)
(finding that city has jurisdiction to impose zoning regulations on Indian lands).
12. Charles F. Wilkinson, To Feel the Summer in the Spring: The Treaty Fishing
Rights of the Wisconsin Chippewa, 1991 Wis. L REV. 375, 412. Wilkinson primarily
addresses the controversy concerning the fact that the Wisconsin Fish and Game
laws do not apply to the Chippewa Bands. Wilkinson concludes that, while time and
money are spent litigating this issue, attention is diverted from more important issues,
such as fish stocking programs, habitat protection, and polluted water. Id.
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cooperative agreement between an Indian tribe and a state. Cooperative
agreements between an Indian tribe and a state focus on substantive
issues with the purpose of solving a particular problem affecting the
states and the Indian tribes.' 3 Generally, the tribe and state agree to
ignore jurisdictional issues for purposes of the agreement. 4 Thus,
cooperative agreements are able to frame the issues that need to be
addressed and limit the continual jurisdictional disputes that lead to
litigation. Furthermore, if conflicts do arise, litigation will be more
focused on substantive issues rather than jurisdictional issues.
Problems may still arise, however, from cooperative agreements.
Poorly drafted cooperative agreements, and the legislation that authoriz-
es them, run the risk of being invalidated by federal law. 5 Further,
courts may be unable to enforce an agreement if sovereign immunity
has not been properly waived by the tribes and states.6 Finally, even if
an agreement is otherwise enforceable, if the court lacks specificity and
objective guidance, it may be unable to enforce the agreement once a
breach occurs."
This Article identifies the problems that can arise when drafting
cooperative agreements and their enabling statutes and discusses strat-
egies and methods to avoid these problems. Part II of this Article
discusses briefly the law regarding state jurisdiction over Indian
country.' This Part explores the tests that courts apply to determine
the validity of state asserted jurisdiction over tribes. Part II also
discusses some of the most important cases on tribal/state jurisdiction
that outline the framework within which cooperative agreements may
operate.
Part Ill of this Article examines what motivates states and tribes to
13. Craghton Goeppele, Note, Solutions for Uneasy Neighbors: Regulating the
Reservation Environment qfter Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima
Indian Nation, 65 WASH. L REv. 417, 434 (1989). Goeppele discusses the uncertainty
caused by Brendale in the area of tribal jurisdiction and suggests that cooperative
agreements are one of the only viable alternatives available to states and tribes. Id.
at 434.
14. For example, the Cooperative Agreement between the Campo Environmental
Protection Agency and the State of California states that one of its purposes is to
"minimize the potential for jurisdictional disputes between [the band's environmental
agency] and the State Agencies." However, it also states that "[n]othing in this Agree-
ment shall limit or expand, or be construed to limit or expand the jurisdiction of the
State Agencies, the Band" or the band's environmental agency. See Appendix A.
15. See infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
16. See in/ra notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
17. See infra text accompanying note 154.
18. See infra notes 23-50 and accompanying text.
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enter into cooperative agreements." This Part also discusses the
various uses for cooperative agreements and addresses a few prelimi-
nary steps that states and tribes must take prior to entering into
cooperative agreements.
Part IV addresses enabling statutes.' It suggests that both states and
tribes pass enabling statutes prior to entering into cooperative agree-
ments and discusses what these statutes should include. This Part also
discusses several of the larger tribes' enabling statutes and the require-
ments for drafting such statutes. In addition, Part IV discusses in some
depth Assembly Bill 240, a recently-adopted California enabling statute
for certain types of projects, and compares and contrasts a handful of
other state enabling statutes.
Part V discusses how a cooperative agreement should be drafted and
what remedies are available to parties upon a breach of the cooperative
agreement." It suggests specific sections that should be considered for
inclusion in cooperative agreements and explores the availability of
court-formulated remedies and contract remedies.
Finally, Part VI discusses the issue of subject matter jurisdiction.'
This section discusses the courts in which parties may enforce coopera-
tive agreements.
11. OVERVIEW OF TRIBAL'STATE JURISDICTION
Because Indian reservations are within the geographic boundaries of
states, states generally perceive Indian reservations as lying within their
own jurisdictional boundaries.' The early Supreme Court decisions
regarding tribal/state jurisdiction clearly held that state laws had no
effect in Indian country.' However, courts have since carved out
19. See infra notes 51-118 and accompanying text.
20. See iijfra notes 119-154 and accompanying text
21. See infra notes 155-174 and accompanying text.
22. See i0fra notes 175-206 and accompanying text.
23. Royster & Fausett, supra note 2, at 600. The authors go on to state that this
belief arises as a result of the states' ethnocentric views and their inability to per-
ceive native nations as sovereign governments. The authors assert that states perceive
native nations as equivalent to municipalities, thus granting tribes some self-govern-
ment, but otherwise subjecting them to state authority. Id. at 613.
24. -he Cherokee nation ... is a distinct community... in which the laws of
Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter
but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and
with the acts of Congress." Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832).
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exceptions to this clear-cut standard. Currently, the ability of a state to
assert jurisdiction over Indian lands depends on two related issues.'
The first issue is whether state action infringes on tribal sovereignty.'
The second issue is whether state authority is preempted by federal
law.
To resolve tribal/state jurisdictional disputes, courts now focus
primarily on traditional federal preemption with inherent sovereignty
serving as a "backdrop."' Under this preemption analysis, courts
balance the interests involved and recognize state authority if it does
not interfere with federal or tribal interests, unless the state interests
are sufficient to justify the intrusion.' Unfortunately, this balancing
test is very subject-matter specific. For example, a case that defines
jurisdiction between tribes and states in the area of cigarette taxes is
generally inapplicable in the area of hunting licenses. The result is that
no coherent body of law exists regarding tribal/state jurisdiction.
A. Tribal Interests
The starting point in the preemption test is a determination of the
tribal interests involved. Courts have recognized a tribe's interest in
protecting its inherent sovereignty ever since Chief Justice Marshall
25. In White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, the Court described the two tests
as "independent but related barriers" to state jurisdiction. 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1979);
see also Boisclair v. Superior Court, 801 P.2d 305 (Cal. 1990) (finding that state court
lacked jurisdiction to determine whether a road was owned by an Indian tribe).
26. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959) (finding that a civil suit by a non-
Indian against an Indian Is governed by tribal law where the cause of action arose
on the Indian reservation).
27. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. at 143. The Court in White Mountain
Apache Tribe found that state law was preempted by federal law. Id. at 145-53. One
commentator noted that the preemption test gives the states greater power to exer-
cise jurisdiction over tribes because "the preemption question assumes that the states
have the power unless the federal government has preempted it. John Marshall, it
seems certain, would have said that the states lacked power in Indian country unless
Congress had affirmatively granted it." William C. Canby, Tribal Court, Federal Court,
State Court. A Jurisdictional Primer, 29 AREz. AT'Y, July 1993, at 24.
28. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 176 (1989) (upholding a
state severance tax on the on-reservation production of oil and gas by non-Indians by
finding that tribal independence alone is not enough to invalidate a state law).
29. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216 (1987). After
weighing the economic interests of the tribe against the state interests, the Court in
Cabazon found that the state had no right to regulate bingo and poker on the
Cabazon reservation. The Court found that the Cabazon tribe had no natural resourc-
es and that gaming enterprises presented the sole source of revenue for the tribal
government Id at 218-19. The Court concluded that the state interest's in crime
prevention is outweighed by the tribe's economic interest Id. at 221-22.
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characterized tribes as "distinct, independent political communities"
with inherent attributes of sovereignty.3 However, courts are more
willing to preempt state asserted authority if the tribe has traditionally
exercised authority in the area." The Supreme Court has recognized a
tribal interest in encouraging economic development on Indian reserva-
tions.' Thus, to the extent state regulation impedes economic develop-
ment, preemption is more likely. Tribes are also interested in protecting
their lands from abuse by the states. The Ninth Circuit recognized that
tribes have a legitimate fear that states will use Indian reservations as a
"dumping grounds" for off-reservation hazardous wastes if states, rather
than the tribes, control the reservations' hazardous waste regulations.'
One factor that can weigh against a tribe in determining whether an
interest is "legitimate" is the amount of resources available to a tribe to
regulate its lands. Tribes often lack resources to implement a complex
regulatory scheme. States, on the other hand, are generally better
funded and have a twenty year head start on the tribes in regulating
such areas.'
B. Federal Interests
Tribal interests and federal interests often overlap because of the
federal trust responsibility that the federal government holds with
respect to tribes.' Consequently, the federal government is interested
30. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 559 (1832).
31. Compare Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983) (holding that the state could
require a tribal member to obtain a state liquor license because tradition has not
recognized inherent sovereignty by Indians over liquor regulations) with Cabazon
Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. at 220 (limiting Rice to its facts and looking
instead at current federal Indian policy to determine whether a tribe has authority to
regulate an area).
32. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. at 217 n.21.
33. Washington v. Environmental Protection Agency, 752 F.2d 1465, 1470 (9th Cir.
1985) (finding that the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act does not authorize
states to regulate Indians on Indian lands, regardless of state fears that Indian lands
will become (lumping grounds).
34. Walker & Gover, supra note 4, at 78.
35. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831) (invalidating Georgia's attempts to
enforce Georgia laws on the Cherokee Nation, including a law that would distribute
the Cherokee Nation's land among the people of Georgia). The Ninth Circuit stated,
"The Federal government has long been recognized to hold ... a trust status to-
wards the Indlan-a status accompanied by fiduciary obligations." Santa Rosa Band of
Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655, 660 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038
1301
in protecting Indian lands from intrusion by state regulation and abuse
and in furthering economic development on Indian land."
Furthermore, the federal government is interested in the uniform
enforcement of certain regulations, such as environmental regulations,
to ensure nationwide protection," To accomplish this, the federal gov-
ernment is interested in ensuring that neither state laws nor tribal laws
conflict with any of the federal government's laws.
C. State Interests
The state is interested in protecting its citizens from problems that
originate on the reservation. Pollution, for example, cannot always be
contained within jurisdictional boundaries. Consequently, states fear
that if they are unable to enforce state statutes on Indian reservations,
land under the control and jurisdiction of the state may be damaged
and citizens off the reservation may be adversely affected.'
(1977). The court in Agua Caliente Band of Indians v. City qf Palm Springs dis-
cussed the history of the trust relationship in California. 347 F. Supp. 42, 46 (C.D.
Cal. 1972). That court stated that "[ulpon receiving disturbing reports of the abusive
treatment which the Indians were receiving from the Whiteman and the widespread
destitution and misery which were apparent among their numbers, Congress enacted
the General Allotment Act of 1887 and the Mission Indian Relief Act of 1891,' which
set aside land for the Indians to be held in trust by the federal government. Id,
(footnotes omitted).
36. In 1970, the executive branch promoted a policy of Indian self-determination.
In 1975, the legislative branch furthered this policy by enacting the Indian Self-Deter-
mination Act, which specifies ways that tribes may take control or share control of
their governments. In 1983, the Reagan administration adopted a new Indian policy
acknowledging the governmental status of Indian tribes. In response, the EPA issued
a policy statement concerning Native Americans in 1984. It states:
EPA recognizes Tribal Governments as sovereign entities with primary author-
ity and responsibility for the reservation populace. In keeping with the prin-
ciple of Indian Self-government, the agency will view Tribal Governments as
the appropriate non-federal parties for maling decisions and carrying out pro-
gram responsibilities affecting Indian reservations.
Sly, supra note 10, at 10434.
In 1967, the Economic Administration designated economic development on Indian
reservations a priority. Ultimately, authority over economic development on reservations
was shifted to the Bureau of Indian Affairs, where it currently remains.
37. Washington, 752 F.2d at 1469.
38. Currently, Indian reservations are required to comply with most federal envi-
ronmental regulations. Thus, states with regulations equivalent to the federal regu-
lation should experience no spillover problems originating on the reservation, assum-
ing adequate federal enforcement. However, for states that have adopted state envi-
ronmental regulations that are stricter than the. federal regulations, spillover effects
may take the form of more lenient regulation on the reservation rather than the
absence of regulation. Some tribes, however, have adopted environmental laws even
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The state has an additional interest in protecting its treasuries from
economic loss. States collect taxes and charge licensing fees on
individuals and businesses within their boundaries and fear losing this
ability to Indian reservations.' However, the courts have offered
differing opinions as to whether taxes and licensing fees can be levied
upon Indians and non-Indians within reservations. The Supreme Court
in Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico' found that although a
state-levied tax may marginally affect certain aspects of on-reservation
oil and gas production, these effects are too insubstantial to preempt a
state from taxing non-Indian oil and gas production on Indian reserva-
tions."' However, states have been expressly barred from taxing
Indians in Indian country.'
Further, in areas where states have been granted authority over
Indian reservations by Congress, state asserted jurisdiction is clearly
not preempted." Public Law 280 is an example of Congressionally-
granted state authority.' It was enacted to grant certain states specific
types of civil and criminal authority over tribes.' The courts, however,
have interpreted Public Law 280 very narrowly and refused to expand
more stringent than the state alternative. For example, the Campo Band of Mission
Indians used California standards as its baseline, but in many respects toughened
those standards. Kevin Gover & Jana L Walker, Escaping Environmental Paternal-
ism: One Tribe's Approach to Developing a Commercial Waste Disposal Project in
Indian Country, 63 U. CoLO. L REV. 933, 939 (1992). Additionally, some state envi-
ronmental programs fill in the gaps of more limited federal programs. Thus, the gap
areas may not be covered on Indian reservations. Richard A. Du Bey et al., Protec-
tion of the Reservation Environment: Hazardous Waste Management on Indian
Lands, 18 ENTrL. L 449, 472 (1988).
39. Du Bey, supra note 38, at 481.
40. 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
41. Id. at 187 (holding that the state of New Mexico may impose severance taxes
on oil and gas produced on the reservation by non-Indians, even though it was
already taxed by the tribe).
42. McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164, 181 (1973) (holding
that an Arizona state income tax was unlawful as applied to a reservation Indian
whose income was derived solely from reservation sources).
43. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207 (1987).
44. See Pub. L 280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953).
45. Id. Public Law 280 created several "mandatory" states, where the state was re-
quired to exercise certain types of civil and criminal authority. Id. "Optional" states
were also created, where the state could choose to exercise certain types of civil
and criminal authority. Id. In 1968, Congress revised the Act regarding "optional"
states to require tribal consent before states could act to assume jurisdiction. States
that had already assumed jurisdiction, however, were allowed to retain it.
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the authority to include any general regulatory authority over Indian
tribes.'
States have an additional interest in protecting non-tribal members
who live on reservations. This issue commonly arises on reservations
that have a "checkerboard pattern" of land ownership.47 The Supreme
Court expanded state jurisdiction over non-Indians on Indian reserva-
tions in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian
Nation.' A divided Court held that the Indian tribe lacked authority to
zone non-Indian fee lands in the area of the reservation open to the
public.' However, the tribe did have authority to regulate non-Indian
lands in the areas closed to the general public if to do otherwise would
endanger economically important areas of the reservation and threaten
spiritual and cultural values.'
The Brendale opinion has further confused state jurisdiction over
tribal lands because the opinion is not a majority opinion and the Court
makes no claim that it is changing the law regarding tribal jurisdiction
over fee lands in general. However, Brendale does suggest that courts
will be willgg to give added weight to the states' interests if the land in
question is owned or occupied by non-Indians.
46. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. at 208.
47. Under the Dawes Act, many reservations were divided into allotments for indi-
vidual Native Americans. 25 U.S.C.A. §§ 331-334 (West 1983 & Supp. 1993). Congress
passed the Dawes Act to promote assimilation of Native Americans into society and
to destroy tribal governments. General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 338-91 (1887).
Subsequent to the Act, many Native Americans sold their land to non-Indians. On
some reservations, lands are held in trust by the federal government for tribal mem-
bers, and fee lands are held by non-members. In addition, federal public land and
state and county land are located on many reservations. Thus, many reservations
have a "checkerboard pattern" of land ownership.
48. 492 U.S. 408 (1989). The reservation at issue in Brendale is an excellent exam-
ple of land ownership on reservations reflecting the "checkerboard pattern." See id
at 415. Approximately 8096 of the reservation was held in trust for the Yakima Tribe.
Id. The remaining 2096 was owned in fee by both Native Americans and non-Indian
owners. Id. Additionally, the reservation was divided into a closed area, in which the
general public was prohibited, and an open area, in which the general public was
allowed. Id. Thus, the issue of who may zone these various areas of the reservation
was confusing at best.
49. Id. at 422.
50. Id. at 444. Justice White, joined by Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy,
stated that tribes should have no regulatory authority over non-members anywhere on
the reservation unless the conduct threatens the "political integrity, the economic
security or the health or welfare of the tribe." Id. at 428. Justices Blackmun,
Brennan, and Marshall generally supported tribal territorial jurisdiction over the entire
reservation. Id. at 448 (Blackmnun, J., dissenting). Justices Stevens and O'Connor
distinguished between the closed and open area, whereby tribes have sole authority
to regulate land use on reservations, except when the interests of non-members pre-
dominate. Id. at 438-39.
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In summary, the current judicial framework provides little guidance
to parties seeking to determine the validity of state asserted jurisdiction
over Indian territory because it is subject matter specific. Thus, unless
the disputes among states and tribes are strictly limited to those
specific disputes previously determined by courts, no precedent exists
upon which parties can reasonably rely. Almost every case presents
new and different issues, and the existing precedents do little to help
the parties predict how a court will rule.
I. COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS
A. Purpose of Cooperative Agreements
A cooperative agreement is an intergovernmental contract between
an Indian tribe and a state that settles or avoids jurisdictional disputes
and determines certain substantive matters." By settling or otherwise
avoiding jurisdictional disputes, parties are generally more willing to
bargain and find a solution to the underlying substantive issues.
Moreover, these agreements should be enforceable in court if properly
drafted and if consistent with enabling legislation and constitutional
principles. However, because there is very little case law addressing
cooperative agreements between tribes and states, it is unclear whether
these agreements will be enforceable as contracts.' Although this
Article treats cooperative agreements as contracts and approaches
cooperative agreements from the perspective of best ensuring their
enforceability, it would be a mistake to view them simply as legal
contracts. Cooperative agreements are more akin to treaties or com-
pacts, in that they form political policies between two governmental
entities, and thereby serve several important purposes for Indian tribes
and states without regard to enforceability.
1. Limit Litigation
States and tribes need to consider alternatives to litigation because
neither party is assured of victory when litigating jurisdictional issues.
Winners and losers end up spending scarce resources to litigate an
51. Regis Pecos & Cheryl Fairbanks, Inter Governmental Relations-A New Era
for Resolving Tribal-State Disputes, Feb. 1991, at 17.
52. See infra note 79 and accompanying text. Tribal-state cooperative agreements
are the "vanguard of modem Indian policy." Wilkinson, supra note 12, at 413.
1305.
issue that brings neither side closer to a solution of the underlying
problems.' However, litigation is likely to continue absent some form
of forced negotiation. Afraid of losing their jurisdiction, states and
tribes are generally unwilling to cooperate with each other. Cooperative
agreements set aside issues of jurisdiction and allow parties to focus on
substantive issues. The multitude of distinct issues that arise in
tribal/state disputes cannot be encompassed within a bright line rule as
evidenced by the incoherence in the case law." However, by their very
nature, cooperative agreements allow tribes and states to address and
solve particularized problems as they arise. Finally, cooperation rather
than litigation should reduce intergovernmental tensions.'
2. Compromise of Competing State and Tribal Interests
The interests of states and Indian tribes often conflict. Many states
and tribes have consequently adopted adversarial roles as each seeks to
protect its own needs.w Cooperative agreements enable states and
tribes to reach a compromise between competing state and tribal
interests.
Cooperative agreements, by their very nature as intergovernmental
agreements, enhance tribal sovereignty. Rather than allowing the federal
or state governments to decide what interests are important to Native
Americans, cooperative agreements allow Native Americans to define
their interests and pursue them in negotiations while giving states some
voice in the governing of tribal land." By using cooperative agree-
ments, rather than unilaterally asserting state jurisdiction, states
recognize that tribes have jurisdiction over their lands and have
inherent sovereignty. "[S]uch cooperation requires as a foundation a
53. Pecos & Fairbanks, supra note 51, at 17. Pecos and Fairbanks assert that
there are several options for resolving tribal state disputes such as legislation, cooper-
ative agreements, and the development of tribal-state protocol. Id.
54. Bradley Nye, Comment, Where do the Buffalo Roam? Determining the Scope of
American Indian Off-Reservation Hunting Rights in the Packfic Northwest, 67 WASIL
L REV. 175 (1992). Nye addresses the case law concerning the hunting rights of Na-
tive Americans and concludes that the current case law is complicated and .Inconsis-
tent, creating jurisdictional uncertainties that "create fodder for further litigation." Id,
at 176.
55. Wilkinson, supra note 12, at 413. "[Iln the making of good public policy, co-
operation is an end in itself. It reduces stresses of all kinds. It heals and builds
community." Id,
56. Pecos & Fairbanks, supra note 51, at 1. Historically, states and tribes have
adopted adversarial roles because of states' initial need for land and currently be-
cause of states' need for development and/or protection of natural resources.
57. Goeppele, supra note 13, at 433.
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certain respect for the other side as a government and a certain
tolerance for differing views and different political determinations. "'
States and tribes can also negotiate agreements regarding the state's
interest in revenues from taxes and licenses on Indian reservations that
are satisfactory to both parties.' The case law regarding whether
states can levy charges on persons and businesses within Indian
territory is relatively unclear.' Thus, both parties have an incentive to
negotiate and come to a mutual agreement in this uncertain area.
3. Share Expertise
Cooperative agreements allow each side to share resources and limit
expenses by reducing administrative and service costs."' Because most
tribal resources are far more limited than state resources, cooperation
is imperative for tribes. Intergovernmental cooperation should also be
facilitated by the fact that tribes have expanded their administrative
structures since the late 1970's and, thus, have resources to offer the
states.' By pooling resources and information, states and tribes can
maximize limited funds. Additionally, tribal/state management agree-
ments are attractive candidates for federal funding.'
58. Laurence, Governmental Power In and Around Indian Country: An Essay
Containing Both a Primer for Newcomers and Some Suggestions for Reform-Minded
Old-timers, 3 INDIAN L J. 45 (1990).
59. States may be willing to forego taxes and fees levied on reservations altogether
if both parties are communicating and cooperating. For example, the State of New
Mexico passed a joint house' memorial requesting a remedy to the Cotton Petroleum
ruling, citing the federal policy of Indian self-determination and the negative economic
consequences of that ruling. Pecos & Fairbanks, supra note 51, at 14.
60. The Cotton Petroleum Court validated a state severance tax on industry located
on an Indian reservation. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 176
(1989). However, most courts have invalidated state taxation of the reservation. Mon-
tana v. Blaclkfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759 (1985) (invalidating the State of
Montana's taxes on an Indian tribe's royalty interests under oil and gas leases issued
to non-Indian lessees).
61. Goeppele, supra note 13, at 433. Goeppele asserts that tribes will benefit great-
ly by acting in concert with the more sophisticated state governments because tribes
will develop the technical and managerial skills necessary to realize their goal of self-
government I&t
62. Wilkinson, supra note 12, at 405. States may now work with more formal
tribal bodies, which often have substantial staffs and expertise to rely upon, especial-
ly in the management of natural resources. Id.
63. See id. at 412. For example, Congress appropriated $300,000 to fund an inde-
pendent assessment of the status of Wisconsin fishery resources to be conducted
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4. Create Certainty and Facilitate Economic Development
The current jurisdictional uncertainty surrounding Indian reservations
scares away potential economic development. After Cotton Petroleum,
some businesses may fear that, by locating on a reservation, they may
face double taxation by both the states and the tribes, resulting in a
greater tax burden than if the business were located off the reservation.
Additionally, some businesses would fear that they may comply with all
of the reservation regulations only to find that they are in violation of
applicable state regulations. This potential deterrence of business
contradicts the federal policy of encouraging economic development on
Indian reservations." A clearer definition of applicable laws will
encourage business investment.
5. Fill the Regulatory Gaps
Ambiguities in jurisdictional authority can create regulatory gaps
because neither the tribe nor the state is sure whether it has the
authority to regulate certain areas. Where authority is unclear, intergov-
ernmental agreements' can fill these gaps. As discussed previously, no
area is less clear than that of non-Indians within tribal reservations.'
In the wake of Brenda/e,' neither states nor Indian tribes are certain
who has the authority to regulate fee lands and non-Indians on tribal
lands.6 The arrangements between states and tribes that worked in the
isolation of reservations in the 1900's often do not work today.' The
jurisdictional difficulties created by the commingling of Indians and
jointly by the federal, state, and tribal governments. Id. at 412 n.194.
64. See supra note 36. Economic development on Indian reservations is spearhead-
ed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Id.
65. Wilkinson, supra note 12, at 410. See also James B. Reed & Mara A. Cohen,
Jurisdiction Over Nuclear Waste Transportation on Indian Tribal Lands: State-
Tribal Relationships, NCSL, Vol. 16, No. 4, STATE LEGISLATIVE REPORT at 5 (1991).
For example, the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources entered into a coopera-
tive agreement with the Menominee Tribe to fill in the regulatory gaps relating to
hazardous and solid waste management Prior to the agreement, state officials were
unsure of their proper role; therefore, they were hesitant to work with Indian tribes,
even when asked to help. State workers who responded to a Menominee hazardous
waste spill did not know if their insurance covered them while working outside the
state's jurisdiction.
66. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
67. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
68. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
69. See FEux S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, 380-81 (1982 ed.)
(pointing out the need for a new and different approach in light of the fact that
reservations are more integrated in modem society).
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non-Indians on reservations require individualized solutions that can be
reached through the use of cooperative agreements.
B. Use of Cooperative Agreements
Cooperative agreements between tribes and states were pioneered for
use in the area of Indian gaming. The catalyst for these agreements
occurred when various Indian reservations established gaming enter-
prises that often conflicted with state prohibitions on gambling. In
response, states attempted to assert jurisdiction over Indian reserva-
tions and ban these gaming practices." To resolve these disputes, the
federal government enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,7 which
explicitly authorized the use of cooperative agreements between the
states and Indian tribes.
Recently, cooperative agreements have been used to address a broad
range of land management issues, especially environmental regulations.
Because of the potential spillover problems associated with pollution,
states are increasingly concerned with imposing environmental regula-
tions on Indian reservations. States, however, are likely preempted from
asserting jurisdiction over Indian tribes in environmental areas because
of the extensive federal environmental statutes that either retain
jurisdictional power for the federal government or specifically grant
jurisdiction to tribes.' Consequently, states are more willing to cooper-
ate with Indian tribes in the area of environmental regulation.
The use of cooperative agreements to address environmental
regulation of Indian reservations has varied depending on the individu-
alized problem faced by the tribe and state. Cooperative agreements
have been entered into to control air pollution on reservations.'
70. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. at 202, 204-06 (1987).
71. 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (1988). Section 2710 provides, in pertinent part, that any
"State and any Indian tribe may enter into a Tribal-State compact governing gaming
activities on the Indian lands of the Indian tribes but such compact shall take effect
only when notice of approval by the Secretary or such compact has been published
by the Secretmy in the Federal Register." Id,
72. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1377(a) (1988) (granting authority over
the Indian tribes to the federal administrator); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)
(1990) (providing that Indian tribes shall be treated as states); Safe Drinldng Water
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-11 (1988) (providing that Indian tribes shall be treated as
states); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9675 (1988) (granting authority over the Indian
tribes to the federal administrator).
73. See Air Quality Memorandum of Agreement (Jan. 1989). This cooperative agree-
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Several cooperative agreements have also been entered into to control
hazardous and solid waste problems occurring on reservations. ' One
cooperative agreement sets up an emergency response plan to be jointly
administered by the state and tribe.'
C. Necessary Steps Prior to Draing Cooperative Agreements
1. Recognizing the Sovereign Authority of Tribes
In order for cooperative agreements to succeed, states must recog-
nize the sovereign authority of the tribes." By entering into such
agreements from a perspective of respect and acknowledgement, states
affirm the possibility of government to government relationships.
Absent such recognition, the state and its agencies will come to the ne-
gotiating table with the expectation that the tribe, like a municipality,
should willingly accept the saddle of state jurisdiction. Consequently,
negotiations will likely break down and no agreement will be reached.
To avoid this, several states have issued proclamations recognizing
inherent tribal sovereignty." Other states have recognized tribal
ment between the state of Idaho and the Shoshone Brannock tribes splits authority
among fee and trust lands and the state agrees to provide technical and professional
assistance to the tribes.
74. See Cooperative Agreement Between the Campo Environmental Protection
Agency and the State of California, 1991 Cal. A.B. 3287 (Dec. 1992). This Agreement
sets up a joint regulation system over waste management facilities. Id. The coop-
erative agreement between the Menominee tribe, the EPA, and the Wisconsin De-
partment of Natural Resources pledges to create joint environmental programs in the
area of hazardous and solid waste and water protection
75. See Reed & Cohen, supra note 65, at 5 (citing "Memorandum of Understand-
ing" (July 1989)). This cooperative agreement is between the North Carolina Emergen-
cy Response Commission and the Eastern Band of Cherokee. It delegates the duty of
drafting the policy for the program to the tribes and the duty of establishing the
technical areas to the state.
76. Wilkinson, supra note 12, at 411-13. Wilkinson further states that we should
recognize tribal sovereignty and a tribe's right to control its land because this right is
"orgaric and grew out of a context that has dignity and deserves to be honored. This
[right] transcends the pervasive principle of our legal system that promises ought to
be kept." Id. at 413.
77. See Wilkinson, supra note 12, at 411 (citing the Centennial Accord Between
the Federally Recognized Indian Tribes in Washington State and the State of
Washington, signed Aug. 4, 1989 and the Executive Order by Governor Michael
Sullivan of Wyoming recognizing and respecting the sovereignty of the Shoshone and
Arapaho Tribes, Exec. Order No. 19894 (Apr. 5, 1989)).
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sovereignty in the language of the enabling statute' or the cooperative
agreement itself.'
A more concrete reason for states to formally recognize tribal
sovereignty is to ensure that courts interpret a cooperative agreement
as a furtherance of 'federal interests. The federal government has
proclaimed an interest in furthering tribal sovereignty and self-govern-
ment.' Thus, a cooperative agreement is less likely to be successfully
challenged as preempted by federal law and legislation if it formally
recognizes that the agreement establishes -and furthers an important
federal policy.
2. Waiver of Sovereign Immunity
Both tribes and states should be willing to waive their sovereign
immunity for any legal actions stemming from their cooperative
agreements. Indian tribes generally enjoy sovereign immunity. from
lawsuits similar to other governmental entities.8' Additionally, tribal
sovereign immunity has not been eroded with exceptions and waivers
to the same extent as state sovereign immunity. However, tribal
sovereign immunity can be waived, and Congress has the authority to
abolish a tribe's sovereign immunity.' Less settled is the extent to
78. See, e.g., Okl. Star. tit. 74, § 1221 (1988) (providing that "(t]he State of Okla-
homa acknowledges federal recognition of Indian tribes recognized by the Department
of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs").
79. See, e.g., Cooperative Agreement Between the Campo Environmental Protection
Agency and the State of California, 1991 Cal. A.B. 3287 (Dec. 1992) (stating "the
Campo Band of Mission Indians .... is a sovereign Indian tribal government recog-
nized as such by the Secretary of the Interior of the United States of Ameri-
ca .. . . ).
80. See supra note 36.
81. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (declining to review action
brought by female member of tribe seeking an injunction against enforcement of
tribal ordinance denying tribal membership to children of female members who
married outside of tribe because suits against tribe are barred by its sovereign immu-
nity); Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165 (1977) (state could
not bring action for declaratory judgement regarding exemption of tribe from applica-
bility of state fishery conservation measures because of tribal sovereign immunity);
United States v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940) (overturning
credit judgment against tribe because of tribal sovereign immunity).
82. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505,
509 (1991); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978). However, courts
will not imply a waiver. Congress must clearly express a desire to waive a tribe's
sovereign immunity.
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which tribes may waive their immunity absent specific authorization
from Congress." According to the United States Code, title 25, sec-
tion 81, tribes cannot contractually waive their immunity in matters
affecting trust property without secretarial or Congressional consent'
However, the Attorney General has held that section 81 does not apply
to contracts with the "Government."'
Perhaps the most effective way to bypass a tribe's sovereign immuni-
ty is for a state to enter into cooperative agreements with a specific
agency or corporation of the tribe that has waived its sovereign
immunity with respect to the cooperative agreement.' The tribe as a
whole may still maintain its sovereign immunity, yet the state can sue
the authorized agency or corporation for breach of the cooperative
agreement. Congress has expressly provided for tribal corporations and
enabled these corporations to waive their sovereign immunity as long
as the waiver is clear and explicit.'
It should be noted that tribes may limit their waiver of sovereign
immunity only to the party with whom the tribe is entering into the
cooperative agreement. Thus, tribes remain immune to third party suits
83. COHEN, supra note 69, at 325.
84. 25 U.S.C. § 81 (1982).
85. 18 Op. Att'y Gen'l 181, 183 (1885). This opinion addresses the issue of whether
a Native American can serve as a postmaster. It held that "[i]n general contracts with
Indians, not citizens of the United States, can only be made under certain statutory
restrictions and regulations . .. which, however, are designed for the protection of
such Indians in their dealings with other persons, and appear to have no application
to transactions with the Government" Id. The ruling is, however, ambiguous as to
whether the term "Government" includes state governments.
86. Most courts have found that tribal corporations have sovereign immunity as
well. See, e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Shelley, 480 P.2d 654 (Ariz. 1971)
(tribal corporation immune from suit); S. Unique, Ltd. v. Gila River Pima-Maricopa
Indian Community, 674 P.2d 1376 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1983) (finding that tribal corporation
retains sovereign immunity of the tribal government as a subordinate economic orga-
nization); Graves v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 570 P.2d 803 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977)
(finding not for-profit tribal corporation to be immune from suit). But see Dixon v.
Picopa Construction Co., 772 P.2d 1104 (Ariz. 1989) (holding that a tribal organization
managed by a board separate from the tribal government was not entitled to sover-
eign immunity).
87. 25 U.S.C. § 477 (1934); Parker Drilling Co. v. Metlakatla Indian Community, 451
F. Supp. 1127 (D. Ala. 1978) (holding that as long as waiver is clear and explicit, an
Indian corporation may waive its sovereign immunity). The court in Kenai Oil &
Gas, Inc. v. Department of Interior found that language in the corporate charter that
the corporation could "sue and be sued" waives the immunity to which the corpora-
tion might otherwise be entitled. 522 F. Supp. 521 (C.D. Utah 1981), afd, 671 F.2d
383 (10th Cir. 1982). However, at least one court has restricted the waiver of an
Indian corporation's sovereign immunity to corporate conduct and prohibited waivers
of sovereign immunity for governmental conduct. Gold v . Confederated Tribes of
Warm Springs Indian Reservation, 478 F. Supp. 190 (D. Or. 1979).
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in connection with the cooperative agreement, yet are liable to the state
or governmental entity with whom they contracted under the coopera-
tive agreement.
3. Keeping Cooperative Agreements Sufficiently Narrow
Courts are more likely to invalidate cooperative agreements that are
overly broad. Courts have routinely held that states generally lack
jurisdiction to regulate Indian reservation activity unless granted such
authority by the federal government.' Cooperative agreements that are
far reaching and appear to be general regulatory schemes are more
likely to be struck down than those that are sufficiently tailored to
address a specific problem. Accordingly, prior to drafting a cooperative
agreement, the tribe and state should enunciate what problem the
agreement is attempting to solve and tailor the agreement to that
specific problem.
4. Obtaining the Necessary Consent
Both the state and the tribe should consent to be bound by coopera-
tive agreements prior to entering into them. States can accomplish this
by enacting enabling statutes that grant power to certain agencies or
political heads to enter into agreements with Indian tribes. Tribes have
several means by which they can meet the consent requirement. Some
tribes have extensive tribal codes requiring them to pass an enabling
statute, similar to a state statute, authorizing the tribe, an agency of the
tribe, or a tribal corporation to enter into cooperative agreements.
Other tribes require far less formal authorization in the form of a grant
from the tribe's General Council. State enabling statutes and tribal
authorization are discussed in detail below.'
It is unclear whether federal consent is necessary prior to entering
into cooperative agreements. Native tribes, as domestic dependent
nations, are a part of the United States and fall under the jurisdiction of
the federal government.' As discussed previously, states cannot
88. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding
that a state statute restricting bingo was unenforceable against the tribe and that
Indians and non-Indians may play bingo on the reservation), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
1020 (1982).
89. See text accompanying infra notes 119-154.
90. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) (refusing to enjoin an act of
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generally assert jurisdiction over tribes when jurisdiction is federally
preempted. However, because tribal sovereignty serves as a "backdrop"
to the federal preemption test, courts should find that tribal/state
cooperative agreements are not preempted unless they directly conflict
with federal law. Cooperative agreements do not involve the forcible
imposition of state laws on Indian tribes. Rather, cooperative agree-
ments present the unique case of tribes acquiescing to some form of
state authority or review." The interests of the tribes and the states
align in favor of cooperative agreements, as does the federal interest in
furthering tribal interests. Consequently, the tribal sovereignty issue is
generally moot.' However, courts should still apply a traditional pre-
emption test and evaluate whether the area has been preempted by fed-
eral law. Thus, narrowly drafted cooperative agreements are less likely
to be invalidated by courts.
a. Constitutional preemption
Federal power over Indian tribes is derived from several sections of
the Constitution. Cooperative agreements must be careful not to
conflict with any of these sections.
i. Supremacy clause
Article VI, section 2 states that the Constitution and the laws of the
United States are the supreme law of the land.' State regulation of
Indian land may not interfere with federal legislation.' Federal legisla-
Congress that disposed of the tribal property of the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache
Indians because of each tribes' dependence on the United States government); Chero-
kee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
91. Felix Cohen states that the primary reason'states are prohibited from exercis-
ing Jurisdiction over Indian Country is because of tribal sovereignty, where state law
may "be duplicative of, and often antithetical to, tribal sovereignty." Consequently,
once this issue is eliminated, the case for invalidation is greatly diminished. COHEN,
supra note 69, at 270.
92. The court in Oglala Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota found that if the balance of
state, federal, and tribal interests so require, the "backdrop" of tribal sovereignty may
be given considerably less weight. 770 F.2d 730 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1091 (1986).
93. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authori-
ty of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
94. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 509-11 (2d ed. 1988);
Laurence, .supra note 1, at 232 ("[S]tate regulation of Indian reservation activity may
not run afoul of express federal legislation, nor may it interfere with the operation of
1314
[Vol. 20: 1295, 1993] Cooperative Agreements
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
tion applies to Indian land if it expressly includes Indian tribes or if the
nature of the legislation or the underlying Congressional purpose
requires uniform application." The Supreme Court has routinely held
that federal legislation preempts state jurisdiction over Indian land."
Consequently, cooperative agreements should expressly state that
nothing in the agreement is meant to supersede or conflict with federal
law. Additionally, it is recommended that the agreement provide for
severance of any part of the agreement that is preempted by federal
law, without affecting the validity of the agreement as a whole.
ii. Treaty clause
The Constitution prevents states from entering into treaties with
Indian tribes. Article II, section 2 grants the President power to enter
into treaties with foreign nations and the Indian tribes.' Article I,
section 10 prohibits states from entering into such treaties.' However,
it is unlilcely that courts will find that cooperative agreements are
preempted by the treaty power as long as the agreements recognize the
supremacy of federal laws and do not purport to be treaties. Further-
more, the federal power to enter into new treaties with tribes was
abolished in 1871." Thus, federal law prohibits construing a contract
with an Indian tribe after 1871 to be a treaty. Consequently, there is no
treaty right upon which to infringe. '" Thus, courts should construe a
federal law in a field that Congress has 'occupied'").
95. Walker & Gover, supra note 4, at 6. However, certain exceptions exist. Laws
that touch exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural matters or abrogate
rights guaranteed by treaties are generally inapplicable to Indian tribes absent an
express declaration by Congress. Id. at 10.
96. Kennerly v. District Court 400 U.S. 423 (1971) (refusing to grant state court
jurisdiction over tribe or tribal members, even where tribe adopted a tribal ordinance
that permitted concurrent state and tribal jurisdiction over tribe); Warren Trading
Post Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965) (invalidating state sales
tax on an Indian reservation because state tax could not be imposed consistently
with federal statutes applicable to the reservation).
97. "[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur .
U.S. CONST. art II, § 2.
98. "No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance or Confederation .... " U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10.
99. 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1871).
100. From 1871 forward, the federal government has entered into bilateral agree-
ments with tribes that have been given supremacy status over conflicting state laws.
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cooperative agreement to be no more than a contract that recognizes
federal supremacy.
iii. Indian commerce clause
Article 1, section 8 gives Congress the authority to regulate com-
merce with foreign nations and Indian tribes."' Because Congress
abolished treaty making, many courts now refer to the Indian Com-
merce Clause as the primary constitutional provision that supports
federal preemption of state laws concerning tribes."n Unlike the "regu-
lar" Commerce Clause, commerce with Indian tribes need not be
"interstate" in order for the Indian Commerce Clause to apply." The
Indian Commerce Clause typically invalidates state law that is federally
preempted or interferes with the sovereignty of Indian tribes."°'
However, the Indian Commerce Clause is not exclusive; the federal
government may delegate the power to regulate commerce among the
Indian tribes to the states." As a general proposition, cooperative
agreements stating that nothing in the agreement is meant to supersede
federal law and that sections conflicting with federal law will be
severed should not be preempted by the Indian Commerce Clause.
iv. Compact clause
Article I, section 10 of the Constitution prohibits states from entering
into "any Agreement or Compact with another State or with a Foreign
power" without the consent of Congress." A court may choose to
interpret the Compact Clause to include agreements among states and
Indian tribes.0 7 However, courts have interpreted the Compact Clause
narrowly and found that consent is required only for agreements that
affect political power or the influence of the states or encroach upon
Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194 (1976) (invalidating application of state fish and
game laws to tribal members because such laws conflicted with an agreement exe-
cuted between the Executive Branch of the Federal government and the Indian tribe,
which provided that the tribe would have the right to hunt and fish).
101. "The Congress shall have the Power to ... regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes...." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8.
102. COHEN, supm note 69, at 208.
103. Id.
104. See supra notes 26-27.
105. See Pub. L 28, 67 Stat. 588 (1953).
106. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10.
107. "When the federal guardianship over tribes is ... considered, it is doubtful
that states and tribes have general authority to make compacts absent congressional
consent." COHEN, supra note 69, at 381.
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the exercise of authority of those states." A court may find that nei-
ther states nor tribes are actually being granted jurisdiction over the
other if cooperative agreements are narrowly and properly drawn. A
court may instead find that each side is merely allocating governmental
responsibilities or sharing responsibility solely for the purpose of the
cooperative agreement.
The language of the Compact Clause does not specifically include
Indian tribes, and it has never been applied to any tribal/state contracts
or agreements.'" A strong argument can be made that the Compact
Clause does not apply to Indian tribes because the federal government
does not recognize the tribes as sovereign foreign powers, but as lesser
domestic dependent nations within the jurisdiction of the United States.
Additionally, tribes no longer rank as states in terms of the Compact
Clause.' While states cannot unilaterally assert even limited ju-
risdiction over other states, the Supreme Court has indicated that states
may be able to assert limited jurisdiction over tribes. Consequently, the
Compact Clause is likely inapplicable to contracts between tribes and
states.
b. Statutory
There is no federal statute or regulation that specifically addresses
Congressional consent to cooperative agreements among tribes and
states in general. However, several statutes may be interpreted to apply
to tribal/state cooperative agreements.
i. 25 U.S.C. § 81-85
Federal approval is generally required for contracts with Indians or
tribes for money, things of value, services related to lands, or claims
under laws or treaties of the United States."' Furthermore, contracts
108. United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978) (find-
ing that Compact Clause did not apply to a Multistate Tax Compact because it did
not increase political power); New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363 (1976) (inter-
state agreement regarding boundary did not require congressional consent).
109. COHEN, supra note 69, at 381.
110. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 332 (1983) (invalidating
New Mexico's fish and game laws as applied to tribes, but stating in dicta that tribes
no longer have the sovereignty initially granted them in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S.
515 (1832)).
111. 25 U.S.C. § 81 (1871). Section 81 prohibits all agreements between any person
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relating to property in the hands of the United States are invalid unless
the United States has previously consented to their maldng1 1 2 These
statutes likely apply to Indian lands held in trust by the United States,
and they may apply to cooperative agreements that govern land, such
as certain environmental and land use agreements. However, if coopera-
tive agreements are narrowly drawn so that they affect regulatory struc-
tures only, a court may find that "land" is not affected. Thus, such
cooperative agreements should not be governed by these statutes.
Additionally, this chapter was enacted to protect Indians in the trust
of the federal government."' Accordingly, a court may choose not to
invalidate cooperative agreements that are entered into voluntarily and
in good faith by Indian tribes in light of current federal policy to further
tribal self-government.
Furthermore, the Attorney General found that sections 81 through 84
did not apply to contracts between Indian tribes and the
"Government."' Although section 85 was enacted after the Attorney
General's opinion, it is not inconsistent with the opinion and should
also be construed as inapplicable to contracts between the Government
and tribes. The Attorney General Opinion, however, is rather dated"'
and is ambiguous as to whether state governments are included within
the term "the Government."
ii. 25 U.S.C. § 476
The Indian Reorganization Act vested authority in tribes to negotiate
with federal, state, and local governments. If cooperative agreements
are challenged, the parties may assert that this provision grants federal
consent to intergovernmental agreements between tribes and states.
While no court has considered section 476 as a grant of federal consent
for cooperative agreements, the bare power to "negotiate" without a
with any tribe of Indians or Individual Indians not citizens of the United States "for
the payment or delivery of any money or other thing of value, in present or in
prospective, or for the granting or procuring any privilege to him, or any other
person in consideration of services for said Indians relative to their lands, or to any
claims growing out of, or in reference to, annuities, installments, or other moneys,
claims, demands, or thing, under laws or treaties with the United States... unless
such contract complies with the requirements of Section 81. Id,
112. 25 U.S.C. § 85 (1913). This section prohibits contracts "with any Indian, where
such contract relates to the tribal funds or property in the hands of the United
States." Id.
113. Whirlwind v. Von der Abe, 67 Mo. App. 628 (1896), (permitting action based on
attempt to enforce contract, regardless of federal statutes, where tribal Indian entered
into an employment contract with the Great Wild West Show).
114. 18 Op. Att'y Genl 181 (1885); see supra note 85.
115. The Attorney General opinion was written in 1885.
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concomitant power to agree confers little authority on the tribes.
Therefore, although it would be a case of first impression, section 476
may be construed as a general consent to such agreements to the
extent they are not preempted by other federal requirements."'
iii. Federal environmental statutes
Congress recently recognized the role of tribal governments and
amended four of the major environmental laws administered by the
EPA so that tribes are treated as states."7 While the Clean Water Act
specifically acknowledges and authorizes cooperative agreements
between tribes and states for the implementation of the requirements of
the Act, such agreements are subject to the review and approval of the
Administrator." ' The consequences of failing to have a cooperative
agreement approved are unclear, but courts are likely to interpret the
section to protect Indian tribes by prohibiting the state from enforcing
the agreement against the tribe without its approval or from engaging in
unfair practices. Parties entering into cooperative agreements should be
aware that, in certain circumstances, federal administrative review may
be required.
In summary, narrowly drafted cooperative agreements between
Indian tribes and states likely do not require federal consent. The
federal policies to promote tribal sovereignty and economic develop-
ment mandate that tribes be allowed to consent to limited state
jurisdiction or regulation. If, however, a court finds that federal consent
is required prior to entering cooperative agreements, the parties could
argue that 25 U.S.C. § 476 has already granted this consent.
116. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 81.
117. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1377(a) (1988); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)
(1990); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-12 (1986); CERCLA, 42
U.S.C.A. § 9601-75 (1988). EPA's Indian Policy makes clear EPA's view that all fed-
eral environmental regulations apply to the Indian reservations.
118. 33 U.S.C. § 1377(d) (1988). Section 1377(d) provides that "an Indian tribe and
the State or States in which the lands of such tribe are located may enter nto a co-
operative agreement, subject to the review and approval of the Administrator, to
jointly plan and administer the requirements of this chapter." Id
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IV. TRIBAL AND STATE ENABLING STATUTES
A. Tribal Statutory Consent
Tribal authorization is necessary prior to entering into a cooperative
agreement. However, tribes vary in their organization and law19
because Federal approval of tribal codes and ordinances is not re-
quired.' Some tribes, such as the Navajo Nation, have a detailed
process by which such enabling resolutions are adopted.'' Other
tribes may require less formal approval from the General Council. State
enabling statutes should authorize cooperative agreements only as
permitted by the organization documents or enabling laws of the tribal
government.
Because each tribe's requirements for authorization vary, this Article
does not purport to discuss enabling authorization for every tribe.
However, this Article will address several of the Indian nations' current
enabling legislation, as well as the general principles that should be
considered for inclusion in all enabling legislation.
1. Representative Tribal Enabling Legislation
a. Navajo
The Navajo Tribal Code grants power to the Intergovernmental
Relations Committee to approve intergovernmental agreements between
the Navajo Nation and states." This section likely applies to coopera-
tive agreements between tribes and states. However, a more detailed
resolution specifically authorizing cooperative agreements is recom-
mended, including therein some of the general sections discussed
below.
119. Tribal law varies from tribe to tribe and can take the form of tribal legislative
enactments, administrative procedures, or customs. COHEN, supra note 69, at 1.
120. Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 731 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1984)
(finding that tribe was not required to submit taxing ordinances to Secretary of Inte-
rior for approval in action by mineral lessee against Indian tribe to invalidate certain
taxes imposed upon lessee by tribe).
121. Tracy v. Superior Court, 810 P.2d 1030, 1036 (Ariz. 1991) ("[T]ribes, such as
the Navajo, chose not to incorporate under the [Indian Reorganization Act] but,
rather, to strengthen their sovereign status and develop their own political sys-
tem .... The Navajo Nation has developed an extensive tribal code that is bound
and supplemented."); Nav9jo Trib. Code tit. 2, §§ 165-174.
122. Navajo Trb. Code tit. 2, § 824 ("The committee shall have the ... power
necessary and proper to recommend ... final approval of any intergovernmental
agreement between the Navajo Nation and any federal state or regional authority.").
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Proposed Navajo resolutions must comply with the following
procedures:
(1) The resolution must be drafted by the department making the
request.
(2) The preliminary draft must be reviewed and signed by the
appropriate authorities.
(3) The draft must shortly thereafter be submitted to the
Legislative Secretary.
(4) The Review Staff must then review the resolution and
supporting documents and place the resolution on the Agenda of the
Tribal Council.
(5) The Advisory Committee must then accept the resolution and
make recommendations to the Tribal Council.
(6) The resolution must be signed by either the Chairman, Vice
Chairman, the Executive Secretary, or the Chairman pro tempore of the
Tribal Council."
b. Cheyenne River Sioux
The Cheyenne River Sioux have specifically enabled cooperative
agreements for the purposes of mutual assistance and definition of
responsibilities in the law enforcement area.' The Chairman of the
Tribal Council is authorized, with the approval of the Tribal Council, to
enter into these agreements. This statute may serve as a forerunner .to
future enabling statutes that solve other specific problems between the
Cheyenne River Sioux and the state.
c. BL(wkfeet
The Constitution for the Blackfeet Tribe provides the Tribal Council
with the power to negotiate with the federal, state, and local govern-
ments on behalf of the tribe. Although this constitutional language
123. Nav. o Tribal Code title 2, sections 165-174 set out the requirements for Nava-
jo resolutions.
124. Cheyenne River Sioux Trib. Code tit. 9, § 2. "The chairman of the Tribal Coun-
cil is authorized, with the approval of the Tribal Council, to enter into cooperative
arrangements and agreements with Federal and state law-enforcement agencies for
purposes of mutual assistance and definition of responsibilities." Id.
125. BLACKFEET CON ST. art. VI (1)(a). "'The council of the Blackfeet Reservation shall
[have the power] . . . to negotiate with the Federal, State and local governments on
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may be adequate to enable cooperative agreements, a more specific
statute would be preferable. An enabling statute could be based on the
authority granted in the Blackfeet Constitution, yet should be expanded
to include some of the specific sections discussed below.
2. Sections to be Included in Tribal Enabling Statutes
When drafting a tribal enabling statute, a tribe should state which
entity will have the authority to negotiate cooperative agreements with
states.' The process for approval of cooperative agreements should
also be discussed in this section. Some tribes may require the approval
of the General Council prior to entering into a cooperative agreement.
Other tribes may attempt to limit the cooperative agreement's appli-
cability to one agency and, thus, require agency approval only.
Additionally, tribal authorization should include a waiver of sovereign
immunity. for purposes of the cooperative agreement.' 7 If, however,
the legislation authorizes only one tribal agency or tribal corporation to
enter into cooperative agreements, only that agency or corporation
should waive its sovereign immunity. As discussed previously, the tribe
may wish to waive its sovereign immunity against the governmental
entity with whom the tribe is entering into the cooperative agreement,
yet still retain its immunity against third parties bringing suit based on
the cooperative agreement.
The tribal authorization should specify that the tribe is not expanding
state jurisdiction over Indian territory, but only agreeing to set aside
any jurisdictional issues and cooperate with the intent of solving a
problem. Such measures should better facilitate the adoption of
cooperative agreements.
The breadth of a tribal enabling statute should depend upon the
individual situation of the tribe. Some tribes may intend to enter into a
cooperative agreement to solve a very specific and isolated problem.
Therefore, the tribe may choose to enact a very specific tribal enabling
statute that strictly defines the framework for cooperative agreements.
Other tribes may intend to use cooperative agreements as a solution to
a variety of continually evolving problems with the state. Consequently,
the tribal enabling statute should be relatively general, stating only who
behalf of the tribe." Id
126. This is important to ensure that a state does not negotiate with an unautho-
rized member of the tribe and waste time and resources.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 81-87. In addition, such a waiver may also
limit the form of dispute resolution (e.g., to arbitration), the parties that benefit from
the waiver, and other matters, Both parties should anticipate the need for and scope
of tribal asset protection In such waivers.
1322
[Vol. 20 1295, 1993] Cooperative Agreements
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
has the authority to enter into cooperative agreements and what steps
need to be taken to enter into a properly authorized agreement.
B. State Statutory Consent
Various state agencies, departments, or officials will be entering into
cooperative agreements with the tribes. Consequently, the state should
authorize these agencies to enter into cooperative agreements, as well
as provide guidance to the agencies to allow for consistency in the
various cooperative agreements.'s In one of the few cases to address
cooperative agreements between tribes and states, the Kansas Supreme
Court invalidated a cooperative agreement between the Governor of
Kansas and the Kickapoo Nation.m The Kansas Supreme Court stated
that cooperative agreements are legislative in nature and concluded that
the Governor has no power to enter into such agreements on behalf of
the state absent either (1) an enabling statute appropriately delegating
power to the Governor to enter into such agreements or (2) legislative
approval of the agreements0'
1. Sections to be Included in State Enabling Statutes
As discussed under tribal enabling statutes, state statutes should
specify who has the authority to negotiate cooperative agreements with
Indian tribes. Narrowly-tailored enabling statutes should designate the
official, such as a department head, who can enter into an agreement.
Enabling statutes that are more general should state what steps need to
128. At least 16 state legislatures have provided authority to local governments and
state agencies to enter into agreements with the tribes for a variety of purposes,
including concurrent exercise of jurisdiction. Reed & Cohen, supra note 65, at 6.
Included within these sixteen states are Arizona (ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-515
(1991)), California (CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25198.2 (West 1991 & Supp.
1992)), Idaho (IDAHO CODE § 674002 (1989)), Montana (MONT. CODE ANN. § 18-11-103
(1991)), Nebraska (NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 13-1501 to -1509 (1991)), New Mexico (N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 74-4B-4 (Michie 1993)), North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-40.2.02
(1989 & Supp. 1991)), Oklahoma (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 1221 (West 1991)),
Washington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 47.20.710 (West 1986)), and Wisconsin (WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 160.36 (West 1989)).
129. Kansas v. Finney, 836 P.2d 1169 (Kan. 1992) (invalidating an agreement be-
tween the state of Kansas and the Kickapoo Nation that authorized casino gambling
on the Kickapoo Indian Reservation and provided for monitoring of such gambling by
the state of Kansas under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act).
130. Id,
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be taken to ratify an agreement. Most states with general enabling
statutes require approval of cooperative agreements by a particular
official or committee.''
Enabling statutes should include a standard for agencies to apply
when negotiating with tribes. State agencies should be legally obligated
to negotiate in good faith. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act requires
states to negotiate cooperative agreements with Indian tribes in good
faith." Because this is one of the only federal statutes that expressly
permits tribal/state cooperative agreements, one may infer a federal
requirement of, or at least a preference for, good faith negotiations. A
good faith standard will ensure that the state comes to the bargaining
table ready to cooperate with the tribe. Additionally, a state should be
able to argue that it is not restricting tribal sovereignty if the state can
show that it entered into an agreement in good faith and that it did not
coerce or negotiate with the Indian tribe unscrupulously.
Additionally, an objective standard for negotiations, if possible,
should be included within the statutory language." The state may
prohibit cooperative agreements if the subject matter falls below the
state standards for licensing or permitting. Such a standard assures that
cooperative agreements will be uniform and that the various state
agencies will treat the tribes similarly.
An enabling statute should also specify that it does not authorize
cooperative agreements that conflict with or are preempted by federal
law. This will establish boundaries for agencies and tribes in negotiating
agreements by prohibiting agreements that conflict with applicable
federal legislation.
Enabling statutes should mention jurisdictional issues and agree to
ignore these issues in the framework of the cooperative agreements.
The legislation should specify that it is not an attempt to expand or
limit the jurisdiction of a state over tribal lands."M
Depending on the needs of the state, an enabling statute can be
131. See e.g.,, MONT. CODE ANN. § 18-11-1105 (1991) (requiring Attorney General to
approve); N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-40.2-04 (1989 & Supp. 1991) (requiring governor to
approve agreement); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit 74, § 1222 (West 1992) (requiring approval
of a committee made up of five Senate members and five House of Representative
members).
132. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)A (1988) (requiring states to "negotiate with the Indian
tribe in good faith to enter into ... a [tribal/state] compact").
133. Specific enabling statutes will be more amenable to objective standards. Gener-
al statutes will likely be able to include only a good faith standard because a more
concrete standard would likely be inapplicable to all areas.
134. MONT. CODE ANN. § 18-11-110 (1981) (stating that cooperative agreements
between the state and Indian tribes may not affect the underlying jurisdiction of any
party unless expressly authorized by Congress).
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drafted narrowly to deal with a specific problem between the tribe and
the state or drafted broadly to authorize negotiation of cooperative
agreements. However, narrower statutes present the need for multiple
legislation, unless the problem to be solved by the cooperative
agreement is an isolated issue. A problem occurs when new issues arise
between tribes and states, whereby legislation addressing these issues
will have to be enacted to authorize cooperative agreements. This could
deter cooperative agreements in new or unusual areas.
The state should waive its sovereign immunity for purposes of the
cooperative agreement." The enabling statute should include language
that the state consents to sue and be sued in courts of competent ju-
risdiction.
2. Califoria Assembly Bill 240
The State of California recently passed legislation, entitled Assembly
Bill 240 (A.B. 240), that authorizes the California Environmental
Protection Agency to enter into an agreement with Indian tribes con-
cerning waste disposal facilities on reservations." The impetus for
A.B. 240 occurred when the Campo Band of Mission Indians began
developing a solid waste project on the Campo Indian reservation.'
Neighbors of the reservation opposed the project and influenced state
legislators to introduce a bill that would have made it illegal to
transport waste to the Campo Reservation.' Although the state's
interest in protecting itself from potential spillover pollution conflicted
with the tribe's interests in self-governance and economic development,
the state, the tribes sponsoring waste projects, and environmental
135. See supra text accompanying notes 81-87.
136. Codified at CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25198.1-25198.1-.9 (West 1991) and
CAL PUB. RES. CODE §§ 44201-44210 (West Supp. 1993). Joel Mack, the co-author of
this Article, Taylor Miller (of Miller, Karp & Grattan), and Kevin Gover (of Gover,
Stetson & Williams) were among those extensively involved in the negotiation of A.B.
240.
137. Walker & Gover, supra note 4, at 58. Initially, A.B. 240 would have made the
transportation of waste to the Campo Reservation illegal. The second version of A.B.
240 would have required all persons to receive a permit prior to transporting any
waste to the Campo Reservation. The third version of A.B. 240 is the version that is
codified at CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25198.1-.9 (West 1991) and CAL PUB. RES.
CODE § 44201-44210 (West Supp. 1993).
138. Walker & Gover, supra note 4, at 58.
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groups were able to reach an acceptable compromise through A.B. 240
and the ensuing cooperative agreement."
One of the most important sections of the statute establishes a
standard by which cooperative agreements must be governed.." A.B.
240 requires any facility to meet the "functional equivalent" of the state
licensing requirements.' Because federal environmental regulations
apply on Indian reservations, an analysis of the differences between
California regulations and federal regulations was necessary to deter-
mine what extra regulations cooperative agreements would require. The
statute lists several California environmental statutory sections explicit-
ly and states that "[a]ny other provision of state environmental... laws
and regulations germane to the hazardous waste facility" must also be
"matched."14
Further, the statute not only enables the parties to negotiate disputes
rather than litigate them, it also shifts the focus away from the jurisdic-
tional questions."3 By essentially agreeing to ignore jurisdictional
problems, the parties are able to concentrate on ensuring that waste
facilities on Indian reservations are as environmentally sound as
facilities built elsewhere in the state. Other topics covered in the statute
also decrease the likelihood of litigation. For example, the tribe is made
eligible for technical assistance from state agencies. " Each coopera-
tive agreement must provide for exchange of information between the
tribe and the agencies concerning the site and monitoring data'4
3. Comparison of Statutes
Idaho's enabling statute authorizes any public agency or the state of
139. In August 1991, Assemblyman Steven Peace, the representatives of the Campo
and La Posta tribes (which included co-author Joel Mack), the Sierra Club, and .the
Planning and Conservation League negotiated and drafted the final version of A.B.
240 in a marathon 20-hour Conference Committee hearing session that was open to
the public. A.B. 240 was revised and approved the following day.
140. CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25198.3(e) (West 1991).
141. Id.
142. Id. § 25198.3(e)(5). The functionally equivalent provisions of tribal or federal
permits and the cooperative agreement "shall collectively be deemed to constitute
permits issued under state law for all purposes of enforcing state law." Id,
§ 25198.6(c).
143. Id. § 25198.6(a).
144. The tribe will be obligated to provide compensation to the agencies for any as-
sistance provided. Id. § 25198.4(b).
145. l § 25198.4(c). Section 25198.4(c) requires each cooperative agreement to
"provide for the sharing of appropriate data and other information between any tribal
regulatory body, any federal agency, the owner or operator, and applicable state
agencies." Id.
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Idaho to enter into agreements with the Indian tribes for the transfer of
property and for joint exercise of power." However, the statute gives
very little guidance to state agencies, includes no standards for
negotiation, and, other than a sentence prohibiting cooperative agree-
ments that are prohibited by federal law, fails to limit the boundaries of
cooperative agreements. 7
In contrast, the Montana statute specifies with far greater detail the
contents of cooperative agreements, including duration, purpose,
administration, and termination of agreements." As a result, several
states have patterned their enabling statutes after the Montana stat-
ute." Additionally, the Montana statute safeguards itself from chal-
lenges of unlawful delegation of jurisdiction by stating that the statute
does not permit such delegation." Further, the Montana statute en-
ables states and tribes to avoid the issue of federal consent by requiring
a cooperative agreement to be filed with the Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs."' If the Bureau of Indian Affairs receives a copy of an agreement
and fails to object to it, a court may find that the federal government
impliedly consented to the agreement. It is unclear, however, whether
such consent is needed. Further, it is uncertain whether merely filing an
agreement with the Bureau of Indian Affairs would be tantamount to
146. IDAHO CODE § 67-4002 (1984). "Any public agency... or the State of Idaho or
any of its political subdivisions may enter into agreements with Indian tribes... for
the transfer of real and personal property and for joint concurrent exercise of pow-
ers .... " I.d
147. Id
148. MONT, CODE ANN. § 18-11-104 (1991). The Montana statute require a coopera-
tive agreement to specify the following.
(1) its duration; (2) the precise organization, composition, and nature of any
separate legal entity created thereby-, (3) the purpose of the agreement; (4)
the manner of financing the agreement and establishing and maintaining a
budget therefor, (5) the method to be employed in accomplishing the partial
or complete termination of the agreement and for disposing of property upon
such partial or complete termination; (6) provision for administering the
agreement, which may include creation of a joint board responsible for such
administration; (7) the manner of acquiring, holding, and disposing of real
and personal property used in the agreement; ... (9) any other necessary
and proper matters.
Id,
149. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-40.2.02 (1984); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 13-1501 to-
1509 (1984).
150. MONT. CODE ANN. § 18-11-110 (1991).
151. Id. § 18-11-107.
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consent or waiver. Although the Montana statute is very specific about
the requirements for cooperative agreements, it fails to address one
very important aspect-the framework for negotiations. Neither state
agencies nor the attorney general, who ultimately approves the
cooperative agreements under the Montana statute, are given guidance
as to whether a tribe should be held to the same standard as a state
agency or whether the state must negotiate with the tribe in good faith.
North Dakota's enabling statute is similar to the Montana statute. One
departure from the Montana statute, however, is that North Dakota
requires an opportunity for public notice and hearing prior to the
approval of all cooperative agreements by the governor."m This has the
potential to weaken tribal interests by allowing citizens to protest the
agreements and put pressure on the governor before an agreement can
be approved."0 The governor, an elected official subject to the approv-
al of public opinion, may be unduly influenced by the public sentiment
among some of the more vocal state citizens.'"
V. TERMS AND REMEDIES
Numerous tribal/state jurisdictional agreements have been reached on
various issues, including law enforcement, taxation, child custody
matters, fire protection, zoning, and motor vehicle registration.0' Thus,
the potential uses for cooperative agreements are extremely broad.
General contract principles apply to cooperative agreements and they
should be kept in mind when drafting. these agreements. However,
152. N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-40.2-03.2 (1984). If the North Dakota state agency re-
ceives a request for a public hearing, *the state agency shall hold a public hearing
prior to the submission of the agreement to the governor at which any persons inter-
ested in the agreement may be heard." Id
153. Unfortunately, racism plays a crucial factor in many protests against projects
or dealings with tribal lands. Many citizens are quick to protest any developments
that benefit Indian tribes, regardless of the merits of the development For example,
in the state of Wisconsin, a beer labeled "Treaty Beer" was put on the market and
became the best-selling brand in some stores and bars in Northern Wisconsin. The
proceeds from sales of "Treaty Beer" are used to oppose Chippewa Treaty rights,
which are perceived by some as granting special and unfair rights to the Chippewa
Indians. Wilkinson, supra note 12, at 376. Equally harmful is the paternalistic attitude
towards Indians taken by many opposed to development on Indian reservations. Such
persons often believe that Indians are noble savages who "are just not smart enough
to develop or regulate [their lands] responsibly. This Indian stereotype is insulting to
say the least, and it smacks of the same arrogance that led fifteenth-century Europe-
ans to conclude that they had 'discovered' America" Gover & Walker, supra note 38,
at 942.
154. This form of enabling statute may present the same state constitutional flaw
discovered in the Kansas statute. See Kansas v. Finney, 836 P.2d 1169 (Kan. 1992).
155. Wilkinson, supra note 12, at 404.
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drafters must remember the unique problems associated with trib-
al/state cooperative agreements. Attached to this Article for reference is
an example of a recently negotiated cooperative agreement under A.B.
240." This section addresses several important terms that should be
considered for inclusion within most cooperative agreements. Addition-
ally, this section addresses the remedies available to the contracting
parties.
A. Terms
1. Limit the Scope of the Cooperative Agreement
A cooperative agreement should not only identify the problem that
the agreement is attempting to solve, but also limit its application to
this area.'57 A cooperative agreement should also specify the geograph-
ic areas to which the agreement applies to avoid confusion. For
example, the agreement should state whether it applies to all land
within the reservation boundaries or only to land owned by non-Indians
within the reservation boundaries.
2. Policy Rationales
To give a court guidance if future litigation should ensue, the
cooperative agreement should include the underlying policy reasons for
its creation, such as to better develop economic opportunities on the
reservation, to protect tribal sovereignty, to, foster tribal state relations,
or to protect state citizens from any harmful spillover problems from
the reservation.' Thus, if litigated, a court will have some guidance as
to how to enforce the cooperative agreement in the manner the parties
156. The attached Cooperative Agreement was negotiated and drafted by Taylor
Miller, of Miller, Karp & Grattan, representing the Campo Environmental Protection
Agency, and legal representatives of various California state agencies.
157. For eaxample, the cooperative agreement between the Campo Environmental
Protection Agency and the State of California lays out several very specific purposes:
to regulate solid waste facilities on the reservation; to establish a system of consulta-
tion and cooperation between the parties in order to comprehensively regulate solid
waste facilities on the reservation; to share technical and professional expertise; to
establish and maintain effective communication between the parties for the regulation
of solid waste facilities on the reservation; and to minimize the potential for jurisdic-
tional disputes between the parties. Cooperative Agreement between the Campo
Environmental Protection Agency and the State of California, 6 (1991).
158. See, e.g., id.
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intended. Additionally, if an agreement is challenged as preempted by
federal law, the agreement itself enunciates several federal interests
regarding the Indian tribes.
3. Jurisdiction
As discussed in Section IV, the cooperative agreement should
specify that it is not an attempt to expand or limit the jurisdiction of a
state or tribe.
4. Severability Clause
The cooperative agreement, like most contracts, should include a
severability clause. Thus, if any section of the cooperative agreement is
invalidated, the cooperative agreement as a whole is not invalidated.
5. Waiver of Sovereign Immunity by both the Tribe and State
As discussed in Section M" and Section IV, 6 both the tribe and
the state should specifically waive their sovereign immunity against
each other for actions based on the cooperative agreement. Absent
such a waiver, the cooperative agreement might be unenforceable."
6. Termination Date
The cooperative agreement may include a termination date or it may
be indefinite. However, an indefinite agreement should include a
process by which one party can cancel the agreement upon either
breach by the other party or upon written notice. Most states require a
minimum notice period of six months, but limit the maximum notice
period to five years." By including a termination clause, a cooperative
agreement is more similar to a contract than a permanent grant of
authority, thereby reducing the risk of preemption or unconstitutionali-
ty.
B. Remedies
Because cooperative agreements between tribes and states are a
recent development and have not been the subject of litigation, it is
159. See supra text accompanying note 129.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 81-86.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 126 and 134.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 81-86.
163. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 18-11-108 (1991).
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unclear what remedies, if any, are available under these agreements.
However, if cooperative agreements have been properly enabled by
both the state and tribal governments, courts would be more likely to
enforce the agreements and apply one of the remedies discussed below.
1. Contract Remedies
Because a court could construe a particular cooperative agreement as
an enforceable contract, each side should anticipate the possibility of
an action for breach of contract.'" However, because of the limited
precedent, it is difficult to determine the remedies available to each
party. If otherwise legally cognizable, a state may be able to sue for
environmental damages based on a tribe's breach of environmental
standards."a On the other hand, a tribe may be able to sue for damag-
es based on a state agency's failure to bargain in good faith.
2. Equitable Remedies
Additionally, if a contract is enforceable, a court could impose
equitable remedies.67 If the parties have begun negotiations, but one
of the parties hinders the ability to reach an agreement, a court may
order the parties to enter into an agreement within a specified time
period.TM If the parties are unable to reach an agreement within the
specified period, the court may appoint a mediator to draft a binding
164. See, e.g., CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25198.5 (West 1991) (-The failure of a
party to a cooperative agreement to meet the requirements of this section shall be
determined to be an actionable breach of the cooperative agreement").
165. See, e.g., id, § 25198.5(e) (party not denied legally available remedies for
breach of hazardous waste agreement because the party entered into a cooperative
agreement).
166. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act permits an Indian tribe to file an action
against a state for failure to negotiate in good faitlh. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i)
(Supp. 1993). The Act further places the burden of proof on the State to prove that
it negotiated in good faith. Id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(ii).
167. See, e.g., CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25198.7. This section states that-
[The) cooperative agreement shall provide that the state or tribe may bring
an appropriate civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction to enforce the
terms of the cooperative agreement as a contract, and shall not limit the
availability to either party of any remedy at law or in equity otherwise avail-
able under California law.
Id,
168. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv).
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cooperative agreement." A court could also enjoin a state or tribe
from certain action.70 Additionally, a court could order specific per-
formance if the cooperative agreement is sufficiently detailed. 7' How-
ever, the cooperative agreement must be specific enough for a court to
enforce it in a manner consistent with the parties' intentions."
3. Remedies Specified in the Contract
The cooperative agreement may specify remedial action for possible
disputes or agreement breaches. A cooperative agreement may require
that the contracting parties meet to discuss the dispute prior to taking
any legal action. A cooperative agreement may require arbitration to
resolve disputes. Arbitration would reduce the costs associated with
litigation and expedite the result. Additionally, a cooperative agreement
may include a liquidated damages clause. However, because cooperative
agreements are contracts, these clauses cannot be punitive in na-
ture." Thus, fines for non-compliance, often used by states to ensure
environmental compliance,'" would likely be unenforceable in a
cooperative agreement. Cooperative agreements may also include an
automatic cancellation clause upon a breach by either party.
VI. SUBJECT MATrER JURISDICTION
Parties to cooperative agreements should consider where they may
enforce the agreements. Tribes and states do not confer subject matter
jurisdiction upon a court by waiving their sovereign immunity, unless
that court would otherwise have jurisdiction over the suit. Rather,
waiving sovereign immunity generally nullifies a party's ability to use
sovereign immunity as a defense." Furthermore, parties to coopera-
tive agreements should determine which choice of law is in their
mutual best interests and implement the agreement in a manner that
best ensures such choice of law.
169. See, e.g., id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(ii) (providing that a court may order an agree-
ment to be reached within 60 days).
170. See, e.g., id. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(ii) (district courts may enjoin any gaming activity
conducted in violation of a cooperative agreement).
171. See, e.g., Duke v. Wheatley, 580 So. 2d 1267, 1274 (Miss. 1991).
172. Id.
173. See, e.g., City of Rye v. Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 315 N.E.2d 456 (N.Y. 1974)
(invalidating a liquidated damages clause of $200 per day for delays in the comple-
tion of a building complex-because the damages were punitive in nature).
174. See, e.g., 42, U.S.C. § 6961(i) (1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.085 (West 1992).
175. Weeks Constr., Inc. v. Oglala Sioux Hous. Auth., 797 F.2d 668, 670-71 (8th Cir.
1986) (barring suit where contractor sued tribal housing authority for breach of con-
tract absent waiver of sovereign immunity).
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It is a common assumption that federal courts have jurisdiction over
most disputes involving Native Americans or tribes. United States Code,
title 28, section 1362 grants federal district courts original jurisdiction
over civil actions brought by an Indian tribe arising under the Constitu-
tion, laws, or treaties of the United States."7 Nonetheless, a federal
question must exist for a district court to have jurisdiction.'= Federal
courts do not have jurisdiction merely because a Native American is a
party or because a suit concerns property or contracts of Native
Americans." "[A] Native American has no greater right than any other
litigant to utilize federal courts." "
If the tribe or other involved litigant has no access to tribal courts
and the state clearly lacks jurisdiction, courts are more willing to find a
federal question. For example, the court in Richardson v. Malone'
found that a contract concerning property within Indian country elicited
a federal question because of the unique federal statutory scheme
dealing with Indian lands.'8' Congress has established an expansive
network of laws addressing Indian country. This network evidences that
"Congress did not intend there to be a vacuum, where no law held
sway."18 Thus, in the absence of tribal or state jurisdiction, the court
in Richardson found that a residue of federal common law applied to
the contract between the parties to the suit." What is unclear is
whether Richardson will be interpreted to apply to all cases in which
neither tribes nor states have subject matter jurisdiction, or whether
176. 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (1982).
177. See id.
178. Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe of So. Ute Reservation, 249 F.2d 915 (10th Cir.
1957) (holding that an alleged wrongful denial of membership in tribe did not auto-
matically confer jurisdiction), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 960 (1958).
179. Richardson v. Malone, 762 F. Supp. 1463, 1467 (N.D. Oka 1991) (non-Indian
plaintiff brought breach of contract action against Indian defendant seeking foreclo-
sure on a security interest in property located in Indian country).
180. 762 F. Supp. 1463 (N.D. Okla. 1991).




Richardson will be interpreted more narrowly to apply only to those
cases involving contracts for property located in Indian country.'"
Courts will likely find that cooperative agreements controlled by
federal statutes invoke a federal question. For example, the Indian
Ganing Regulatory Act enables and encourages tribes and states to
enter into cooperative agreements to determine gaming laws on
reservations. A cooperative agreement drafted under the auspices of
such a law presents a federal question. However, for the myriad of
other cooperative agreements, courts are unlikely to find that a federal
question exists, unless the parties successfully argue that Richardson is
applicable to the facts at issue.
2. Diversity Jurisdiction
Federal courts may attempt to assert jurisdiction over cooperative
agreements if diversity exists between the parties to the agreement.
Native Americans are not, however, foreign citizens for purposes of
diversity jurisdiction. Rather, they are residents of the state in which
they reside." Furthermore, an Indian tribe is not a citizen of any state
and cannot be sued in federal court on the grounds of diversity ju-
risdiction.'M Courts have determined that to allow an Indian tribe to
be dragged into federal court under diversity jurisdiction is antithetical
to the notion of inherent tribal sovereignty.' Courts have, however,
found that tribal agencies can be sued in federal court under diversity
jurisdiction if (1) federal jurisdiction would not infringe on tribal self-
government and (2) the agency is incorporated or located in a state
diverse from the other party.'TM
The parties to a cooperative agreement will almost always be
residents of the same state because the purpose of cooperative agree-
ments is to solve local problems between state governments and the
tribes that reside within them. Thus, federal courts will seldom rely on
184. Conversely, if a tribe has established a tribal court with jurisdiction over the
cooperative agreement, both state and federal courts may lack subject matter jurisdic-
tion. See infra nn.200-01 and accompanying text.
185. Richardson, 762 F. Supp. at 1466.
186. Standing Rock Sioux Indian Tribe v. Dorgan, 505 F.2d 1135, 1140 (8th Cir.
1974) (holding lack of citizenship as part of the court's reasoning for dismissing an
action by a tribe against the state tax commissioner due to Eleventh Amendment
considerations).
187. Id,
188. Weeks Constr., Inc. v. Oglala Sioux Hous. Auth. 797 F.2d at 668, 673 (8th Cir.
1986). However, if the tribal agency is a state chartered corporation, it should be
treated as any other corporation. COHEN, supra note 69, at 355-56.
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diversity of citizenship in establishing subject matter jurisdiction over
cooperative agreements.
B. State Jurisdiction
The argument for state subject matter jurisdiction over cooperative
agreements is strongest where application of Public Law 280 is
proper." In 1953, Congress enacted Public Law 280 to grant certain
states jurisdiction as to both criminal and civil matters." Public Law
280 initially granted only six states such jurisdiction: Alaska, California,
Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin. 91
Although Public Law 280 appears to impart a broad jurisdictional
grant, Congress created a specific exception from state jurisdiction for
the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of real property held by an
Indian or Indian tribe." Courts have interpreted this exception to
189. 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1993). Public Law 280 provides that Alaska, California, Min-
nesota, Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin
shall have jurisdiction over civil causes of action between Indians or to
which Indians are parties which arise in the areas of Indian country [desig-
nated to be governed by Public Law 280] to the same extent that such State
has jurisdiction over other civil causes of action, and those civil laws of such
State that are of general application to private persons or private property
shall have the same force and effect within such Indian country as they have
elsewhere within the state ....
I"L
190. Id. Congress enacted Public Law 280 at a time when Congress thought it best
to assimilate Indians as ordinary citizens. Indian organizations, however, adamantly
opposed Public Law 280 because they feared state jurisdiction, preferring instead fed-
eral jurisdiction because of the federal government's trust responsibility. Boisclair v.
Superior Court, 801 P.2d 305, 310-11 (Cal. 1990).
191. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (1984). Public Law 280 excepts certain reservations from
the blanket of state jurisdiction. Id,
192. Id. § 1360(b) (1984). This section provides that Public Law 280, does not
authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any real or personal
property, including water rights, belonging to any Indian or any Indian tribe,
band or community that is held in trust by the United States or is subject to
a restriction against alienation imposed by the United States; or shall autho-
rize regulation of the use of such property in a manner inconsistent with any
Federal tr aty, agreement, or statute or with any regulation made pursuant
thereto; or shall confer jurisdiction upon the State to adjudicate, in probate
proceedings or otherwise, the ownership or right to possession of such prop-
erty or any interest therein.
Al
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include such state regulation of Indian lands as zoning.'° Additionally,
laws such as Public Law 280 should be liberally construed in favor of
the Indians.' On this basis, cooperative agreements governing Indian
land may also be deemed exempt from state jurisdiction under Public
Law 280.
In 1968, Congress amended Public Law 280 to allow additional states
to assert jurisdiction over Indian tribes.9 ' The 1968 amendment
requires that any state asserting jurisdiction under the 1968 amendment
to Public Law 280 actively assert such jurisdiction and obtain the tribe's
consent to jurisdiction.' In keeping with the current federal policy of
strengthening tribal self-government, courts often refuse to interpret
Public Law 280 in favor of states' jurisdiction over tribes." Hence,
courts have granted states jurisdiction over tribes only where the state
and the tribe have strictly complied with the requirements of Public
Law 280 and its amendments."m
States not covered by Public Law 280 may still assert subject matter
jurisdiction under certain circumstances. First, tribal law may grant
jurisdiction to the state." Second, if the cause of action or some
material event occurs outside Indian country, then states generally may
assert jurisdiction over the action.se Third, in cases where the cause
of action occurs primarily in Indian country and involves an Indian
plaintiff and a non-Indian defendant, the state likely has concurrent
jurisdiction with the tribal courts." Conversely, in cases where the
193. See Boisclair, 801 P.2d at 311 (citing Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings
County, 532 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1975)).
194. Id. at 312 (citing Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 392 (1976)).
195. 25 U.S.C. § 1322 (1968).
196. A state can assert jurisdiction over a tribe only by enacting a statute that en-
ables it to do so. The tribe must consent to state jurisdiction by a majority vote of
all of the enrolled tribal members in the affected area of Indian country. Kennerly v.
District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971) (holding that unilateral action by tribe adopting
state jurisdiction is insufficient to vest state with jurisdiction absent affirmative legis-
lative action by state).
197. Estate of Johnson, 178 Cal. Rptr. 823 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (concluding that
Public Law 280 does not confer the right to impose inheritance tax on reservation
Indians), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 828 (1982).
198. Annis v. Dewey County Bank, 335 F. Supp. 133 (D.S.D. 1971) (finding that ap-
proval of security agreement by tribal council not sufficient to grant jurisdiction to
enforce a creditor's judgment on the reservation).
199. Weeks Constr., Inc. v. Oglala Sioux Hous. Auth., 797 F.2d 668, 673 (8th Cir.
1986).
200. Canby, supra note 27, at 36. "Outside of Indian country, the Indian is the same
as everyone else in the eyes of the law." Id.
201. COHEN, supra note 69, at 342. Because many tribal codes mirror the provisions
of the Bureau of Indian Affairs Code of Courts of Indian Offenses, 25 C.F.R. § 11.22
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cause of action occurs primarily in Indian country and involves a non-
Indian plaintiff and an Indian defendant, the tribal court has exclusive
jurisdiction absent a grant of jurisdiction by the tribe to state courts.'
Finally, states are likely to have some jurisdiction over cases arising on
either small unorganized reservations or allotments outside reservations
with no form of tribal self-government.' Federal jurisdiction, howev-
er, may be more appropriate in such a case.2'
C. Tribal Jurisdiction
In addition to the types of jurisdiction discussed above, tribal courts
have "inherent power to exercise civil jurisdiction over non-Indians in
disputes affecting the interests of Indians that are based upon events
occurring on a reservation." ' Tribal codes often state whether juris-
diction in certain matters is retained by the tribe or granted to the
state. In the Weeks case, the pertinent section of the Oglala Sioux Tribal
Code specifically retained jurisdiction of all suits involving a defendant
who is a member of a tribe within the tribal court's jurisdiction."
D. Determining Jurisdiction
In determining which court will have jurisdiction, the parties to
cooperative agreements should first consider the possibility of a federal
question or diversity of citizenship. If neither exists, then the parties
should attempt to determine whether a court is more likely to find
tribal or state jurisdiction. If the state is a Public Law 280 state, a court
would be more likely to grant subject matter jurisdiction to the state.
However, absent application of Public Law 280, it is difficult to predict
which court will assert subject matter jurisdiction. Under these
circumstances the parties to the cooperative agreement may agree that
one court best safeguards both parties' interests. Thus, the parties may
tailor the negotiations and the drafting of the cooperative agreements to
.(1979), which imposes jurisdiction only over actions against Indian defendants, many
tribes have not authorized their courts to entertain civil cases against non-Indian
defendants. Id
202. Id.
203. Id. at 350.
204. See supm notes 180-84 and accompanying text.




best ensure that the agreement will be governed by a particular jurisdic-
tion. Such attempts may include the following measures: (1) conducting
all negotiations regarding the cooperative agreement in the location of
the chosen jurisdiction; (2) ensuring that actions required under the
cooperative agreement take place in the location of the chosen
jurisdiction to the extent possible; for example, the parties may require
that the tribe or agency report only to the state headquarters rather
than sending state officials to the Indian reservation; (3) including a
choice of law provision in the cooperative agreement. Recognition of
choice of law provisions is very fact specific and enforcement of the
cooperative agreement in the desired jurisdiction cannot be guaranteed.
However, parties may have a better chance of enforcing their coopera-
tive agreements in a particular jurisdiction if they consider subject
matter jurisdiction at the beginning of the negotiation and drafting of
the cooperative agreement.
VII. CONCLUSION
The last century has seen substantial conflict between states and
Indian tribes over jurisdiction. Flexible solutions beyond litigation are
needed so that both parties may move forward with certainty and
efficiency. One solution is the utilization of tribal/state cooperative
agreements. The states and tribes are in the best position to know their
own needs and to decide what they are willing to concede in order to
fulfill those needs. Compromise through negotiated agreements between
two sovereign governmental entities will ensure maximization of bene-
fits to both parties. However, states and tribes must carefully draft
cooperative agreements and enabling statutes to avoid the pitfalls of
invalidation. This Article has set forth numerous pitfalls and has sug-
gested ways to circumvent them. By entering into properly drafted
cooperative agreements, states and tribes will be able to move into the
twenty-first century in a spirit of cooperation and compromise.
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AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT is entered into in duplicate this 10th day of December, 1992
by and between the CAMPO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
("CEPA"), an agency of the Campo Band of Mission Indians, a federally-recognized
Indian tribal government, whose address is 1779 Campo Truck Trail, Campo, Califor-
nia 91906; and the State of California, by and through the California Environmental
Protection Agency, whose address is 555 Capitol Mall, Suite 235, Sacramento, Califor-
nia 95814, with reference to the following:
RECITALS
WHEREAS, the Campo Band of Mission Indians (the "Band") is a sovereign Indi-
an tribal government, recognized as such by the Secretary of the Interior of the United
States of America, and identified on page 52830 of Number 250 of Volume 53 (De-
cember 29, 1988) of the Federal Register, and.
WHEREAS, the Band is attempting to promote its powers of self-government and
to achieve economic independence through the establishment and operation of several
business enterprises on the Campo Indian Reservation ("Reservation"); and
WHEREAS, the Campo General Council, the governing body of the Band, has
authorized the development of a non-hazardous solid waste project on the Reservation,
including a solid waste sanitary landfill, a composting facility, and a recycling facility;
and
WHEREAS, the Campo General Council has established the Campo Environmen-
tal Protection Agency ("CEPA") for the purpose of regulating environmental quality
on the Reservation; and
WHEREAS, the Campo Band of Mission Indians Solid Waste Management Code
of 1990 (the "Solid Waste Code") directs CEPA to regulate solid waste handling and
disposal on the Reservation for the protection of air, water, and land from pollution
and nuisance and for the protection of public health; and
WHEREAS, the Solid Waste Code authorizes CEPA to enter into contracts to
carry out its responsibilities; and
WHEREAS, an adequate system of regulation is necessary to improve and protect
environmental quality on the Reservation and to protect the health, safety, and welfare
of the residents and businesses of the Reservation and of southeastern San Diego
County; and
WHEREAS, the State of California has a comprehensive program for the regula-
tion of solid waste handling and disposal; and
1
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WHEREAS, the state program is implemented and enforced in part by the Califor-
nia Environmental Protection Agency: ("Cal/EPA"); California Integrated Waste Man-
agement Board ("CIWMB"); the State Water Resources Control Board ("SWRCB");
the California Regional Water Quality Control Board, San Diego Region ("Regional
Board"); the Air Resources Board ("ARB"); and the San Diego County Air Pollution
Control District ("San Diego APCD") (collectively, the "State Agencies"); and
WHEREAS, CEPA finds that the State Agencies have the technical expertise to
assist in enforcing CEPA's standards for solid waste handling and disposal, and CEPA
wishes to enter into agreements with the State Agencies to obtain such assistance; and
WHEREAS, the State Agencies may determine that they have sufficient expert
staff to provide the appropriate level of assistance to CEPA for specific tasks, and the
State Agencies wish to enter into a general agreement with CEPA to provide such
assistance where feasible and mutually agreed by future specific memoranda of agree-
ment; and
WHEREAS, the California Legislature enacted legislation, Assembly Bill 240,
Chapter 805, Statutes of 1991 ("Chapter 805") signed by the Governor on October 10,
1991, authorizing the Secretary of Cal/EPA ("the Secretary") to enter into cooperative
agreements with Indian tribes concerning the regulation of Solid Waste Facilities; and
WHEREAS, CEPA submitted on March 9, 1992 a written request to the Secretary
to convene negotiations concerning a cooperative agreement as authorized by Chapter
805; and
WHEREAS, CEPA submitted a draft cooperative agreement to the Secretary on
March 9, 1992; and
WHEREAS, the Secretary, on July 30, 1992, provided public notice of his pro-
posed action to enter into a cooperative agreement and of the findings and determina-
tions that are required by Chapter 805; and
WHEREAS, a public hearing concerning the Secretary's proposed action was held
on August 24, 1992, at Alpine, California; and
WHEREAS, the proposal being considered by CEPA concerning Solid Waste




WHEREAS, the State Agencies have completed the determinations required by
Chapter 805, including determinations that the system of regulation established by
CEPA for the facilities described in Appendix A meets the requirements of functional
equivalency with certain state standards; and
WHEREAS, the Secretary has determined to enter into a cooperative agreement,
as set forth herein;
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the Recitals hereinabove -mentioned and
of the terms, conditions, covenants, and warranties hereinafter mentioned to be kept,
honored, and performed by the parties, it is hereby agreed as follows:
TERMS AND CONDITIONS
Section I. Definitions
Unless otherwise expressly stated, the following terms used in this Agreement shall
have the following meanings:
A. 'Agreement" shall mean this Agreement between CEPA and the State.
B. "ARB" shall mean the Air Resources Board of the State of California.
C. "Band" shall mean the Campo Band of Mission Indians, an Indian tribe
recognized by the Secretary of the Interior of the United States of America.
D. "Cal/EPA" shall mean the California Environmental Protection Agency.
E. "Campo General Council" shall mean the governing body of the Campo
Band of Mission Indians.
F. "CEPA" shall mean the Campo Environmental Protection Agency, a gov-
ernmental agency of the Band.
G. "CEPA Permit" shall mean a permit proposed or issued by CEPA authoriz-
ing and establishing conditions concerning the construction and operation of a solid
waste project pursuant to the Solid Waste Regulations.
H. "CIWMB" shall mean the California Integrated Waste Management Board.
I. "Composting" shall mean the controlled biological decomposition of organ-
ic wastes that are source separated from the municipal solid waste stream, or which
are separated at a centralized facility. "Compost" includes vegetable, yard, and wood
wastes that are not hazardous waste.
J. "EPA" shall mean the United States Environmental Protection Agency.
3
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K. "Hazardous waste" shall mean any substance, material, smoke, gas, particu-
late matter, or combination thereof that:
(1) because of its quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or
infectious characteristics (defined in the Solid Waste Regulations as "infectious
waste"), may either cause or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or
serious irreversible or incapacitating illness, or pose a substantial present or potential
hazard to human health, living organisms, or the environment when improperly treat-
ed, stored, transported, disposed of, or otherwise handled;
(2) is defined to be hazardous or toxic by the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 or the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act of 1976, as either Act may be amended from time to time, and
by any regulations promulgated thereunder, including but not limited to any substance,
material, smoke, gas, particulate matter, or combination thereof containing asbestos or
polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs"); or
(3) is hazardous, toxic, ignitable, reactive, or corrosive and that is de-
fined and regulated as such by CEPA, the State of California, or the United States of
America.
L. "Hazardous material" includes but is not limited to any hazardous material
as defined in Chapter 6.95 .of Division 20 of the California Health & Safety Code
(commencing with section 25500) and any substance, material, smoke, gas, particulate
matter, or combination thereof that is toxic, ignitable, reactive, corrosive, an irritant, a
strong sensitizer, or which generates pressure through decomposition, heat, or other
means, if it may cause substantial personal injury, serious illness, or harm to humans,
domestic animals, or wildlife, during or as a proximate result of its disposal. The
terms "toxic," "corrosive," "flammable," "irritant," and "strong sensitizer" shall be
given the same meaning as in the California Hazardous Substances Act (Chapter 13
commencing with Section 28740 of Division 22 of the Health and Safety Code). '
M. "Recycling Facility" shall mean the facility for recycling, including all
appurtenant structures and equipment, including without limitation all access roads, all
necessary utilities, all necessary water wells, and all modifications and additions to and
replacements of each, to be constructed, operated or installed on the Reservation.
N. "Regional Board" shall mean the California Regional Water Quality Control
Board, San Diego Region.
0. "Reservation" shall mean the Campo Indian Reservation.
4
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P. "San Diego APCD" shall mean the San Diego County Air Pollution Control
District.
Q. "Solid waste" shall mean all putrescible and nonputrescible solid, semisolid,
and liquid waste, including, but not limited to, garbage, trash, refuse, paper, rubbish,
ashes, industrial waste, construction and demolition waste, abandoned vehicles and
parts thereof, discarded home and industrial appliances, manure, vegetable or animal
solid and semisolid wastes; other discarded solid, liquid, and semisolid wastes from a
wastewater treatment plant, water supply treatment plant, or air pollution control facili-
ty, or other discarded gaseous material resulting from industrial, commercial, mining,
or agricultural operations, or community activities; and not including solid or dissolved
material in domestic sewage, solid or dissolved material in irrigation return flows, or
industrial discharges that are point sources subject to permits under 33 U.S.C. § 1342,
sources, special nuclear, or byproduct material as defined by the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2011 et eg., and not including hazardous material,
as defined hereinabove.
R. "Solid Waste Code" shall mean the Campo Band of Mission Indians Solid
Waste Management Code of 1990.
S. "Solid Waste Facilities" shall mean the facilities described in Appendix A.
T. "Solid Waste Regulations" shall mean the Solid Waste Regulations promul-
gated by CEPA pursuant to the Solid Waste Code.
U. "State Agencies" shall mean Cal/EPA, the ARB, San Diego, APCD,
CIWMB, SWRCB, and the Regional Board or any of them individually or in combina-
tion.
V. "SWRCB" shall mean the State Water Resources Control Board.
W. "Technical Assistance Memorandum of Agreement" or "TAMA" shall mean an
agreement between CEPA and a State Agency concerning assistance from and the
involvement of a State Agency in the design, establishment, and implementation of a
permit system as further provided in Section X of this Agreement and in agreements
executed pursuant to Chapter 805 of the California Statutes of 1991.
Section H. Purpose and Scope of Agreement
A. This Agreement is entered into for the following purposes:
(I) Promptly and effectively to regulate Solid Waste Facilities on the
Reservation, the operation and regulation of which facilities are of great concern to
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(2) To establish a system of consultation and cooperation between
CEPA and the State Agencies comprehensively to regulate Solid Waste Facilities on
the Reservation.
(3) To share technical and professional expertise among CEPA and the
State Agencies.
(4) To establish and maintain effective communication between CEPA
and the State Agencies regarding the regulation of Solid Waste Facilities on the Reser-
vation.
(5) To minimize the potential for jurisdictional disputes between CEPA
and the State Agencies.
(6) To meet the requirements of Chapter 805.
B. This Agreement encompasses the regulation on the Reservation of the Solid
Waste Facilities described in Appendix A.
C. The parties to this Agreement expressly recognize that the parties are each
empowered to enforce their respective laws, rules, and regulations against persons
within their respective jurisdictions.
Section m. Jurisdiction
Nothing in this Agreement shall limit or expand, or be construed to limit or ex-
pand, the jurisdiction of the State Agencies, the Band or CEPA with respect to the
Solid Waste Facilities, including but not limited to the enforcement powers and proce-
dures available to the State or the Band with respect to those facilities to the extent
not preempted by federal law, including but not limited to powers and procedures
contained in state or tribal statutes or regulations.
Section IV. Functional Equivalency
A. Ihe Solid Waste Facilities will be regulated in accordance with the design,
permitting, construction, siting, operation, monitoring, inspection, closure, postclosure,
liability, enforcement, and other regulatory provisions applicable to a Solid Waste
Facility, or which relate to any environmental consequences that may be caused by
facility construction or operation, which provisions are set forth in the Solid Waste
Code and Solid Waste Regulations and as such Code and Regulations may be amend-
ed from time to time after the execution of this Agreement. The Solid Waste Code
and Solid Waste Regulations are incorporated by reference herein and will have the
same force and effect with respect to this Agreement as though fully set forth. In the
6
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event definitions of terms in the Solid Waste Code and Solid Waste Regulations con-
flict with those set forth in Section I of this Agreement, the definitions of this Agree-
ment shall control for purposes of interpreting this Agreement.
B. The State Agencies have determined that the Solid Waste Code and Solid
Waste Regulations are functionally equivalent to provisions of the following State laws
and regulations which are germane to the type of Solid Waste Facility proposed for
construction and operation on the Reservation as set forth in Appendix A:
(1) Article 4 (commencing with Section 13260) of Chapter 4, Chapter 5
(commencing with Section 13300), and Chapter 5.5 (commencing with Section 13370)
of Division 7 of the Water Code.
(2) Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 41700), Chapter 4 (commenc-
ing with Section 42300), and Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 42700), Part 4, and
Part 6 (commencing with Section 44300) of Division 26 of the State Health and Safety
Code.
(3) Division 30 of the State Public Resources Code.
(4) All germane regulations adopted pursuant to the statutes specified
in this section.
C. The Cal/EPA has determined that the Solid Waste Code and Solid Waste
Regulations are functionally equivalent to other provisions of State environmental,
public health, and safety laws and regulations germane to the Solid Waste Facilities,
including applicable provisions contained in the following: Article 10.5 (Management
of Lead Acid Batteries) (commencing with Section 25215), Article .10.6 (Management
of Small Household Batteries) (commencing with Section 25216), and Article 13
(Management of Used Oil) (commencing with Section 25250) of Chapter 6.5 of Divi-
sion 20 of the Health and Safety Code.
D. CEPA will incorporate standards and requirements germane to the protec-
tion of the environment, public health, and safety and consistent with the State laws
and regulations listed in Paragraphs B and C, as such provisions may be amended
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(1) The standards and requirements do not discriminate against a tribe
which has executed a cooperative agreement, or a lessee or contractor of such a tribe,
and are applicable to, and are not more stringent than, other State standards and re-
quirements applicable to similar or analogous facilities or operations outside the Reser-
vation.
(2) Adequate notice and opportunity for comment on the incorporation
of new and amended standards or requirements is provided to CEPA to facilitate any
physical or operational changes in the facility in accordance with State law.
E. Except for emergency regulations, notice of any proposed amendments of
the Solid Waste Code or Solid Waste Regulations shall be given to the State Agencies
at least forty-five (45) days prior to their adoption. CEPA shall provide public notice
of such proposed adoption, in accordance with applicable tribal laws and regulations.
Except for emergency regulations, such notice shall normally include a 30-day period
for public comment. The State Agencies shall determine whether such amendments
affect their prior determination that the Solid Waste Code and Solid Waste Regulations
are functionally equivalent to applicable State regulations. If a State Agency does not
respond within such forty-five (45) day period to CEPA's notice, such proposed
amendments shall be deemed not to affect the State Agency's determination that the
Solid Waste Code and Solid Waste Regulations are functionally equivalent as provided
above.
F. Cal/EPA or CEPA, as appropriate, shall provide at least 30 days' public
notice of proposed amendments to the Cooperative Agreement.
G. To facilitate participation by CEPA in rule-making proceedings, and other-
wise to review matters concerning the operation of this Agreement, the State Agencies
shall periodically meet with CEPA informally to review regulatory and technical
trends, upcoming regulatory or legislative proceedings, operation of the Solid Waste
Facilities, and other relevant matters.
Section V. Completeness of Application
CEPA shall transmit a copy of any application for a Solid Waste Facility Permit or
any applicable federal permit to each of the State Agencies. CEPA and the State
Agencies may mutually agree in writing that certain portions of an application or cer-
tain types of applications which are not germane to regulations established and en-
forced by that agency, need not be so transmitted. The State Agencies shall provide
detailed comments regarding the completeness of the application within thirty (30)
days after receiving any copies of applications filed for tribal and applicable federal
8
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permits with respect to the deficiencies, if any, of the application with respect to the
State standards identified in Section III, Paragraphs B and C. The failure of any of
the State Agencies to provide those comments within that period shall be deemed a
finding of completeness of the respective applications.
Section VI. Permit Review
A. CEPA shall transmit a copy of a draft of any CEPA Permit and any appli-
cable federal permit to each of the State Agencies prior to final issuance of the permit.
CEPA and the State Agencies may mutually agree in writing that certain portions of a
permit or certain types of permit applications which are not germane to regulations
established and enforced by that agency need not be so transmitted. The State Agen-
cies shall review any draft tribal permit and any applicable federal permit to deter-
mine, based on existing policies, practices, and precedents, whether it contains condi-
tions sufficient to:
(1) Meet the germane functionally equivalent standards as provided in
Section IV of this Agreement.
(2) Provide not less than the level of protection for public health, safe-
ty, and the environment that would have been achieved if that State Agency had is-
sued the permit.
(3) Implement all feasible mitigation measures. For purposes of this
paragraph, "feasible" has the same meaning as in California Public Resources Code
Sections 21001, 21002.1, and 21004, and any regulations adopted pursuant thereto.
B. The State Agencies shall provide comments within seventy-five (75) days
of receipt of the draft permit. If a State Agency does not provide such comments, the
permit conditions shall be deemed sufficient to meet the conditions of Subparagraphs
(1), (2), and (3) of Paragraph A of this Section.
C. Permits issued by CEPA shall meet the conditions of Subparagraphs (1),
(2), and (3) of Paragraph A of this Section.
D. Within ten days of issuance of a final CEPA Permit or applicable federal
permit, a copy of that permit shall be provided to Cal/EPA.
Section VII. Enforcement
A. Compliance with the standards established in the Solid Waste Regulations
will be enforced by CEPA through various means, including but not limited to inspec-
tions, notices, and orders. At least ten days before issuing an enforcement order which
is not for an emergency, within five days after issuing an enforcement order for an
emergency, or within fifteen days after discovering a violation of a Solid Waste Regu-
lation, or term or condition of a CEPA or applicable federal permit for the Solid
9
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Waste Facility, which is likely to result in an enforcement action, CEPA will advise
the appropriate State Agency of the violation or proposed action.
B. To the extent authorized by law, the State may exercise its enforcement
powers over the Solid waste Facilities, subject to all of the following requirements:
(1) A violation or threatened violation of any CEPA standard or re-
quirement or any condition set forth in this Agreement or any permit for the facility
has occurred or is occurring. For purposes of this paragraph, "threatened violation"
means a condition creating a substantial probability of harm, when the probability and
potential extent of harm make it reasonably necessary to take immediate action to
prevent, reduce, or mitigate damages to persons, property, or natural resources.
(2) The violation or violations have been brought to the attention of
CEPA through written notice from Cal/EPA. The notice shall identify the specific
violation or threatened violation which is occurring or has occurred and a specific
corrective or enforcement action or range of actions, including sufficient penalties.
The notice shall include a specific and reasonable schedule in which to take appropri-
ate corrective or enforcement action.
(3) CEPA, after receiving such notice, has failed to take the action or
actions or to take other reasonable action to abate or correct the violation or threatened
violation within a reasonable time.
C. Nothing in this Section provides or shall be interpreted to provide any juris-
diction or regulatory authority to the State Agencies or CEPA that the State Agencies
or CEPA would not have in the absence of this Agreement. CEPA does not, for itself
or on behalf of the Band, concede jurisdiction or waive any defenses it may have to
assertion of jurisdiction by the State Agencies or the State of jurisdiction. The State
Agencies do not concede jurisdiction or waive any defenses they may have to asser-
tion of jurisdiction by CEPA or the Band.
Section VIII. Disputes
A. CEPA, Cal/EPA, and appropriate State Agencies agree to meet and confer
if a dispute arises between the parties regarding the performance of any party under
the terms of this Agreement.
B. A State Agency unsatisfied with the resolution of a dispute may, at its




C. After having in good faith met and conferred with CEPA, the State may, to
the extent authorized by law, file an appropriate civil action in a court of competent
jurisdiction to enforce the terms of this Agreement as a contract. Such action shall not
limit the availability to either party of any remedy at law or in equity otherwise avail-
able.
Section IX. Sovereign Immunity
A. CEPA Waiver.
(1) CEPA hereby waives any right of sovereign immunity it may enjoy
to the extent necessary to allow, and for the express and only purpose of allowing, the
State to exercise and enforce its rights under the terms of this Agreement, and CEPA
consents to suit by the State for any and all such controversies and claims in any court
otherwise having jurisdiction over the subject matter. The State acknowledges that the
provisions of this Subsection constitute a partial waiver of CEPA's immunity from
suit. The waiver of sovereign immunity contained herein shall be effective only to the
extent necessary for the State to enforce its rights and remedies under this Agreement,
and it is expressly understood and agreed by the parties that the waiver of sovereign
immunity contained herein shall extend only to the State. CEPA expressly refuses to
waive its sovereign immunity as to any action brought by any party other than the
State, including but not limited to actions by third-party beneficiaries, if any, of this
Agreement.
(2) The parties understand and agree that nothing in this Agreement is
intended, nor shall it be construed, to waive the sovereign immunity of the Band or to
create a liability or obligatioh on the part of the Band. In addition, the parties under-
stand and agree that CEPA may not:
(a) Expressly or impliedly enter into agreements of any kind on
behalf of the Band.
(b) Pledge the credit of the Band.
(c) Dispose of, pledge, or otherwise encumber
real or personal property of the Band.
(d) Secure loans or incur indebtedness requiring any obligation,
contribution, or guarantee on the part of the Band.
(e) Waive any right of, or release any obligation owed to, the
Band.
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(3) CEPA appoints Kevin Gover, Esq., with an office on the date here-
of at Gover. Stetson & Williams, P.C., 2501 Rio Grande Boulevard, N.W., Albuquer-
que, New Mexico 87104 ("CEPA's Process Agent") as its agent to receive, on behalf
of it and its property, service and copies of the summons of the complaint and any
other process that may be served in any action or proceeding. Such service may be
made by mailing or delivering a copy of such process to CEPA in care of CEPA's
Process Agent at the above address. CEPA shall notify the State of any substitution of
or replacement for CEPA's Process Agent in writing and in accordance with this
Agreement.
B. State Waiver.
(1) The State hereby waives any right of sovereign immunity it may
enjoy to the extent necessary to allow, and for the express and only purpose of allow-
ing, CEPA to exercise and enforce its rights under the terms of this Agreement, and
the State consents to suit by CEPA for any and all such controversies and claims in
any court otherwise having jurisdiction over the subject matter. CEPA acknowledges
that the provisions of this Subsection constitute a partial waiver of the State's immuni-
ty from suit. The waiver of sovereign immunity contained herein shall be effective
only to the extent necessary for CEPA to enforce its rights and remedies under this
Agreement, and it is expressly understood and agreed by all parties that the waiver of
sovereign immunity contained herein shall extend only to CEPA.
(2) - The State appoints the Assistant Secretary for Law Enforcement
and Counsel, with an office on the date hereof at the California Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, 555 Capitol Mall, Sacramento, California 95814 ("the State's Process
Agent") as its agent to receive, on behalf of it and its property, service and copies of
the summons of the complaint and any other process that may be served in any action
or proceeding. Such service may be made by mailing or delivering a copy of such
process to the State in care of the State's Process Agent at the State's Process Agent's
above address. The State shall notify CEPA of any substitution of or replacement for
the State's Process Agent. Such notice shall be in writing and shall be given. in accor-
dance with this Agreement.
Section X. Data: Time Schedules: Access
A. CEPA and the State Agencies shall provide each other and appropriate
State Agencies with all monitoring data collected with respect to the Solid Waste Fa-
cility, inspection reports, correspondence, emission source testing data, draft and final
12
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permits, notices of violations, consent orders, abatement orders, compliance schedules,
and other public documents relating to the regulation of the Solid Waste Facilities. To
the extent authorized by Chapter 805, the State Agencies shall not release to any per-
son information received pursuant to this Agreement and that is privileged, proprietary,
or trade secret information.
B. The parties to this Agreement may mutually agree in writing to modify
time periods for actions required by this Agreement or Chapter 805, except the time
periods provided for public notice, review, and comment by Chapter 805 shall not be
eliminated or reduced.
C. CEPA shall provide for reasonable access by State Agency personnel to the
Reservation to assist with permit application review, inspection, and monitoring of the
operation of the Solid Waste Facilities. Any State Agency wishing to enter the Reser-
vation shall first provide notice to CEPA in writing or by telephone. Only State
Agency employees or other governmental employees or contractors authorized by a
State Agency shall be permitted to enter the Reservation. CEPA may require that
such personnel be accompanied by a designated representative.
D. The State Agencies shall also provide for reasonable access for purposes of
permit application review and inspection, to the extent the State Agencies can provide
that access, by CEPA personnel to trainsfer stations or similar facilities located outside
of the Reservation and handling waste to be transferred to the Reservation. Any per-
mit issued or approved by a State Agency for a solid waste facility, from which solid
waste is or may be transferred to the Reservation, shall contain a requirement to allow
reasonable access by CEPA to such facilities for the same purposes as State Agency
personnel may enter the Reservation as provided by Paragraph C of this Section.
Section XI. Technical Assistance
A. CEPA shall be eligible for technical assistance, to the extent feasible, from
the State Agencies for the design, establishment, and implementation of a permit sys-
tem, cooperative monitoring programs, tribal enforcement system, and implementation
of any other regulatory requirement. State Agencies may provide such assistance in
accordance with this Agreement as specifically agreed to in Technical Assistance
Memoranda of Agreement ("TAMA").
B. In consideration of the services to be provided by the State Agencies,
CEPA shall pay the State Agencies for the above services at the rate mutually agreed
to in a TAMA. Expenses for necessary equipment, materials, and travel for staff of
the State Agencies shall be reimbursed by CEPA. Payment for services and reim-
bursement for expenses shall not exceed the amount as provided in the applicable
TAMA in any given year. CEPA shall not be obligated for any payments or reim-
bursements beyond such amount except as mutually agreed in writing in advance.
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Section XII. Term of Agreement
This Agreement shall remain in effect until terminated by CEPA or the State. No
termination of this Agreement shall occur unless the terminating party has established,
after following the dispute resolution procedures established herein, that one of the
parties or a State Agency has breached a material condition of this Agreement.
Section XIIL Delay or Omission; Remedies
Except as expressly provided in this Agreement, no delay or omission to exercise
any right, power, or remedy accruing under this Agreement shall impair such right,
power, or remedy, nor shall it be construed to be a waiver of or acquiescence in a
breach of or default under this Agreement. The parties specifically and affirmatively
agree not to construe the conduct, statements, delay, or omission of any other party as
altering in any way the Parties' agreements as defined in this Agreement. Any waiver,
permit, or approval of any breach of or default under this Agreement must be in writ-
ing, and, because the language of this Section was negotiated and intended by the
parties to be binding and is not a mere recital, the parties hereby agree that they will
not raise waiver or estoppel as affirmative defenses so as to limit or negate the clear
language and intent of this Agreement. All remedies, either under this Agreement, by
law, or otherwise afforded to any party shall be cumulative, not alternative.
Section XIV. Notice
Any notices, payments, demands, or communications required or permitted under
this Agreement shall be in writing and shall be deemed to have sufficiently been given
if personally served on or delivered by commercial courier, or sent certified or regis-
tered mail, return receipt requested and postage prepaid, and addressed to the other
party at the addresses indicated on the first page of this Agreement, or at such other
address as any party shall hereafter furnish the other in writing. If mailed, such notice
shall be deemed to have been made on the third (3rd) day after posting, or on the date
actually received, whichever occurs first. If sent by a commercial courier that guaran-
tees next day delivery, such notice shall be deemed to have been made on the first





If any provision in this Agreement shall be held invalid or unenforceable by a
court of competent jurisdiction, such holding shall not invalidate or render unenforce-
able any other provision of this Agreement, and the affected parties shall negotiate in
good faith to amend this Agreement to effectuate fully their intent as embodied in this
Agreement.
Section XVI. Entire Agreement: Modification
There is no agreement or promise on the part of any party to do or omit to do any
act or thing not herein mentioned. All prior agreements between or among the parties,
in any combination, whether oral or written, confidential or public, express or implied,
are hereby expressly superseded and replaced in full by this Agreement, which consti-
tutes the entire agreement between the parties and may not be effectively amended,
changed, modified, or altered without the written consent of both parties. Notwith-
standing the preceding sentence, TAMA may be amended upon mutual agreement of
CEPA and one or more of the State Agencies.
Section XVII. Headings
The headings to the various sections of this Agreement are inserted only for conve-
nience of reference and are not intended, nor shall they be construed, to modify, de-
fine, limit, or expand the intent of the parties.
Section XVm. Consents: Reasonableness; Good Faith
The parties agree to cooperate fully with each other and to act reasonably, in good
faith, and in a timely manner in all matters hereunder so that each of them may obtain
the benefits to which they are entitled hereunder and for which they have negotiated.
All parties agree to negotiate in good faith and without delay as to all matters requir-
ing negotiation. No party shall unreasonably deny, withhold, or delay any consent or
approval required or contemplated for any action or transaction proposed to be taken
or made hereunder, except as otherwise provided herein.
Section XIX. Gender: Number
Any noun or pronoun used herein shall refer to any gender and to any number as
the context requires or permits.
15
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Agreement is executed on behalf of the Band by
CEPA, acting by and through its Chairman pursuant to Resolution No. autho-
rizing such execution and by the State of California, acting by and through the Secre-
tary of CaLEPA pursuant to authority provided by Chapter 805.










Solid Waste Facilities Description
The facility is an integrated solid waste management project which will in-
clude a sanitary landfill and a materials recovery (recycling) facility.
The facilities and ancillary facilities are proposed to be located on a 600-acre
site within a 1,150 lease area in the Southeastern section of the reservation (Proposed
Site). The landfill portion of the proposed project would require a total of approxi-
mately 400 acres. Two other sites have been identified as possible alternatives. They
are a 210 acre canyon site in the central portion of the reservation (Site 1), and a
150-acre canyon site in the southwestern comer of the reservation (Site 2).
The proposed Solid Waste Facility is classified as a Class III landfill pursuant
to the CEPA Solid Waste Management Regulations (Title V, Section 505.23) and the
California Code of Regulations ("CCR", Title 23, Division 3, Chapter 15).
Wastewater sewage or water treatment sludge may be accepted if it meets certain stan-
dards. Infectious waste, asbestos, petroleum or its byproducts, polychlorinated
biphenyls, and other hazardous or toxic wastes would not be accepted for disposal
treatment or recycling.
The capacity of the Proposed Site and Site 1 is estimated to be 40 million
cubic yards (or about 28 million tons). Alternative Site 2 has a lifetime capacity of
approximately 45 million cubic yards (or 31.5 million tons).
An engineered double liner system and leachate collection system would
underlie the disposal area. Landfill gas control would be accomplished by drilling gas
monitoring wells and conducting monthly gas detection checks. When the gas reaches
extractable levels, extraction wells would be operated to collect the landfill gas (pri-
marily carbon dioxide and methane) from the landfill. The gas would be flared on-site
using multiple flares constructed as the cell development proceeds.
The Proposed Site and Site 1 would be designed to accept waste either by
rail or truck. Site 2 would probably be limited to truck access due to rail line con-
struction limitations.
The proposed Materials Recovery Facility (MRF) would house the recycling
activities and would provide temporary storage for recovered materials prior to ship-
ment to markets. The MRF would be located adjacent to the landfill and would occu-
py approximately 10 acres.
17
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CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY APPROVES
COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT WITH
CAMPO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
December 10, 1992 For further information contact:
James Lee (916) 324-9670
(Sacramento) - Today, California's Secretary for Environmental Protection,
James M. Strock, approved the Cooperative Agreement with the Campo Environmental
Protection Agency (CEPA). Representing the Campo Band of Mission Indians, the
Director of CEPA, Michael Connolly, joined Secretary Strock in signing the Agree-
ment today. This Agreement was developed and adopted pursuant to the requirements
of Assembly Bill 240 (Chapter 805, Statutes of 1991), authored by Assemblyman
Steve Peace and signed by Government Wilson in August of 1991. The Cooperative
Agreement defines the requirements for the construction and operation of the proposed
solid waste recycling and disposal facility on the Campo Reservation, in San Diego
County.
"We are pleased to join with Mr. Connolly today in signing this Cooperative
Agreement," stated Secretary Strock. "The Agreement, like the legislation authorizing
it, represents the fruit of lengthy and productive negotiations. The results have been
positive for Cal/EPA, because CEPA has adopted stringent standards for the design,
construction and operation of the proposed facility. These standards are at least as
protective, and in some cases more so, than those in effect throughout California."
"To complement these tough standards, we expect CEPA to be diligent in
enforcing them," continued Strock. "Mr. Connolly has assembled a well-trained team
at CEPA, and I have confidence that he and his staff are prepared for the task. How-
ever, we stand ready to step in, should Cal/EPA action be required to prevent environ-
mental contamination problems."
"This Cooperative Agreement sets a national precedent for cooperative rela-
tions between States and Indian Tribes," emphasized Strock. "We are creating today a
model of environmental partnership between States and Tribes that we anticipate will
greatly reduce the potential for litigation, and prevent the conflicts that have occurred
between Tribes and States in the past."
CEPA initially submitted the proposed Cooperative Agreement to Cal/EPA
on March 21, 1992, thereby beginning the formal review, comment and decision peri-
od. After a series of negotiations between Cal/EPA and CEPA, Secretary Strock re-
leased for public review and comment the proposed Cooperative Agreement with
CEPA on July 21, 1992. A public hearing on the proposed Agreement was held on
18
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August 24, 1992, at the Community Center in Alpine, California. The public com-
ment period closed on October 19, 1992. A response to comments was prepared by
Cal/EPA and was also released today.
A Cal/EPA team reviewed the proposed cooperative agreement and found
that it meets the requirements of Chapter 805. Cal/EPA and its constituent units - the
State Water Resources Control Board, the Integrated Waste Management Board and
the Air Resources Board - reviewed the CEPA system for regulation of the proposed
solid waste recycling and disposal facility on the Campo Indian Reservation. This
review established that the Campo Environmental Policy Act of 1990, the Solid Waste
Management Code of 1990, and the Campo Environmental Protection Agency Regula-
tions, taken together, meet the requirements of the legislation and are functionally
equivalent to the state laws and regulations, as required.
Cal/EPA and its constituent units found that the CEPA regulatory system is
very closely patterned after the California regulatory system for solid waste recycling
and disposal facilities. Cal/EPA and its constituent units have also found that the
CEPA system will provide at least as much protection of public health and safety and
the environment as does the California statutory and regulatory system. As a result,
Cal/EPA and its constituent units determined that there are no material differences
between the State laws and regulations and the proposed Tribal functionally equivalent
provisions.
19
1358
